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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-4-2-103(2)(e) and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 is applicable where the evidence 
shows the transaction did not involve the "offer" or "sale" of a security because the 
transaction did not involve a disposition or attempted disposition for value, but rather was a 
mere change in the form of ownership. 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness because it was 
presented to the trial court on undisputed facts in various motions to dismiss. See State v. 
MacGuire, 2004 UT 4,fflJ7-8, 84 P.3d 1171. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in Appellant Jamis Johnson's Motion 
to Quash Bindover and Dismiss Information, (R. 131-58), Motion to Dismiss (R.843-73), 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1201-1215), and Johnson's Motion to Dismiss at trial, 
during the close of the State's case-in-chief. (R. 1999:268-90.) 
2. Issue: Whether the District Court committed reversible error by allowing the 
State's expert witness, Michael Hines, the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of 
Securities, to testify and provide impermissible legal conclusions and incorrect 
interpretations of the law to the jury. 
Standard of Review: "The determination as to who qualifies as an expert witness and 
the admissibility of the witness's testimony fallfs] within the discretion of the trial court," 
which will not be reversed "[a]bsent a clear abuse of this discretion." Evans ex rel Evans v. 
-1 -
Langston, 2007 UT App 240,f7,166 P.3d 621 (first alteration in original). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in Johnson's pre-trial motions in 
limine, (R. 1145-46,1149-51), objections at trial, (R. 1999:42-43, 47, 49, 51-53, 56-57,106-
07) and Johnson's Motion for a New Trial, (R. 1621-1670). 
3. Issue: Whether the District Court erred in failing to give curative jury 
instructions following its admission of improper expert testimony and other evidence. 
Standard of Review: "'Whether the trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury 
instruction constitutes error is a question of law, which we may review for correctness." State 
v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185,1f52, 4 P.3d 100 (further citations omitted). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved during trial, (R. 1999:496) and in 
Johnson's Motion for a New Trial. (R. 1638,1646-47, 1663,1667.) 
4. Issue: Was Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1, as applied here, unconstitutionally 
vague and violates the separation of powers clause of the Utah Constitution? 
Standard of Review: "Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of law, 
which we review for correctness." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,^5, 86 P.3d 735 
(citation omitted). "An as-applied challenge . . . succeeds if the challenger shows that the 
statute was applied to him or her in an unconstitutional manner." State v. Herrara, 1999 UT 
64,1J4 n.2, 993 P.2d 854 
Preservation of Issue: Johnson's Motion for a New Trial. (R.1630,1640-42.) 
5. Issue: Did the trial court err in denying Johnson's renewed motion for a new 
trial and/or reduction in severity of the offense where newly discovered evidence from the 
restitution hearings established the property allegedly exchanged for securities was valueless? 
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Standard of Review: "When reviewing a trial courtfs denial of a motion for a new 
trial, [appellate courts] will not reverse 'absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.' 
At the same time, however, [appellate courts] review the legal standards applied by the trial 
court in denying such a motion for correctness." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,^31, 37 P.3d 
1073 (citations omitted). 
Preservation of Issue: Johnson's Renewed Motion for New Trial. (R. 2003-2012.) 
6. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in ordering restitution where there was no 
evidence that the alleged "victims" suffered any pecuniary loss, let alone a loss equal to the 
restitution order, resulting from Johnson's alleged violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). 
Standard of Review: "Whether a restitution [award] is proper ... depends solely upon 
interpretation of the governing statute, and the trial court's interpretation of a statute 
presents a question of law, which we review for correctness." State v. Gibson, 2006 UT App 
490,^6, 153 P.3d 771 (second and third alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted). 
Preservation of Issue: R. 1619-20; 1954-63; 1988-94; 2018-31; 2032-42. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative statutes and rules for this appeal are attached in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(v) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (2)(b) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Utah R. Evid. 702(a) 
Utah R. Evid. 704(a) 
Utah Constitution, art. I, sec. 7 
Utah Constitution, art. V, sec. 1 
Utah Constitution, art. VI, sec. 1 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves the State's overzealous1 and unconstitutional actions to prosecute 
Johnson under Section 61-1-1 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act for alleged omissions of 
material fact in connection with "the sale or offer" of a "security." The "sale" at issue 
involved Ronald Myers's and James Young's, the alleged "victims," exchange of the assets of 
Milk-King, LLC (the "LLC"), which were 100% owned by Young and Myers, for 100% 
ownership of American Dairy.com, Corp. ("American Dairy or the "Corporation")—in 
essence, a change in their form of ownership of the assets. The State alleged that Johnson, 
who signed as "CEO" for the Corporation in the transaction but who had no ownership of, 
or participation in the formation or management of, the Corporation before or after this 
transaction, violated Section 61-1-1 by failing to disclose to Myers and Young (a) pending 
bar disciplinary proceedings against him, (b) judgments against him personally, and (c) all of 
the financial information for the Corporation that would be in a securities registration 
statement. To obtain a conviction, the State misapplied the law and encouraged its expert 
witness, Michael Hines, a member of the executive branch, to provide impermissible and 
incorrect legal conclusions during his testimony. This is illegal and violates the constitution. 
Procedural History 
Criminal Information andBindover 
A Criminal Information was filed against Johnson and co-defendant A. Paul 
1
 In July 2008, a Legislative audit of the Utah Division of Securities was performed, 
citing, inter alia, alleged overzealous actions, procedural errors, and failure to follow policies 
Schwenke on April 4, 2005, later amended by the First Amended Criminal Information 
("Amended Information") on October 24, 2005. (R.1-3, 63-65.) The Amended Information 
charged Johnson and Schwenke with one count securities fraud in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-1 and § 61-1-21 and one count theft by deception, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-405, both second degree felonies. (Id.) Following a preliminary hearing, 
Johnson and Schwenke were bound over for trial on both charges.2 (R. 77-81.) In a 
prehearing bench memorandum and during the preliminary hearing, the State (including 
through its expert, Mr. Hines) insisted Section 61-1-1 required Johnson to affirmatively 
disclose "all material facts" to Young and Myers (R. 42, 49-50; 274:7,14), as opposed to the 
language of the statute which only requires Johnson to disclose material facts necessary to 
make a statement made not misleading, in light of the circumstances in which the statement 
is made. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). 
Johnson subsequently filed a Motion to Quash Bindover and Dismiss Information 
("Motion to Quash"). (R. 131-273.) The grounds for the Motion to Quash were (1) the 
elements of Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 were not met because the transaction was a "change 
in the form of ownership transaction" with no value transferred and thus no "offer" or 
"sale" of securities, let alone an offer or sale that exceeded $10,000; (2) the elements of 
Section 61-1-1(2) were not met because there were no untrue statements of material fact or 
materially misleading statements made by Johnson; and (3) the elements of Section 76-6-405 
were not met. (Id) In opposition, the State argued, inter alia, that Johnson violated Section 
2
 On Johnson's motion, his trial was later severed from Schwenke's. (R. 429.) 
Schwenke was later convicted of securities fraud, theft by deception and communications 
fraud. See State v. Schwenke, 2007 UT App 354 (unpublished mem. decision.) 
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61-1-1(2) because Johnson was a "control person" of American Dairy, obligated to disclose 
all items required by a registration statement, which Johnson failed to make. (R.300-04.) 
Upon the State's stipulation, the charge against Johnson for theft by deception in 
violation of Section 76-6-405 was dismissed. (R.541-44.) However, on September 6, 2006 
the trial court denied Johnson's Motion to Quash the securities fraud charge ("Bindover 
Order", R. 541-45, attached as Add. B). The trial court found, inter alia, (1) Section 61-1-1 
was applicable to the case; (2) the State satisfied the statutory requirements of 61-1-1; (3) 
there were several omissions by Johnson that could be materially misleading, including 
Johnson's status as a disbarred attorney and a civil judgment against Johnson; (4) Myers and 
Young lost control of the assets of the LLC; and (5) the doctrine of "change in the form of 
ownership" did not apply. (Id.) Johnson filed a petition for interlocutory appeal to this 
Court (R. 644-45), which was denied November 1, 2006. (R.702-03.) 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Proceedings 
On July 21, 2006, representing himself pro se> Johnson initiated a civil suit in Third 
District Court, Case No. 060912102, against Schwenke and several John Does for fraud 
stemming from the facts underlying the criminal case against Johnson. (R. 596.) Although 
not parties, Myers and Young were witnesses in this suit and, as such, Johnson obtained 
subpoenas and took Myers' and Young's depositions on August 14, 2006. (R. 596-97.) 
After his deposition, Myers consulted with State prosecutor E. Neil Gunnarson and 
they discussed Myers' testimony. Gunnarson advised Myers to stop Young's deposition, 
which he did mid-deposition. (R.597-98.) Johnson then: (a) moved in the civil case for an 
order of contempt against Gunnarson and Myers; (b) filed a bar complaint against 
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Gunnarson; and (c) filed criminal allegations in Salt Lake County against Gunnarson for 
witness tampering. (R.598.) In response, in the criminal case, the State filed a Motion for 
Court Review of Defendant's Conditions of Release and Order for No Contact to prohibit 
Johnson from further contact with Myers or Young ("No Contact Motion"). (R.546-57.) 
Johnson, in turn, filed a Motion to Disqualify E. Neal Gunnarson and the Office of 
the Attorney General in the criminal case ("Disqualification Motion"). (R.575-94.) The trial 
court granted the No Contact Motion on September 25, 2006. (R. 639-40.) Following a 
hearing on the Disqualification Motion, at which the court commented to Gunnarson that 
the case was becoming too personal for him, Mark E. Baer substituted as counsel for the 
State on January 29, 2007. (R.1165, 1194-95.) The remaining portion of the Disqualification 
Motion—to disqualify the Office of Attorney General—was denied, subject to the condition 
that "Mr. Baer is not to consult with Mr. Gunnarson regarding this matter and to create a 
wall of separation to prosecute this case independently." (R.1317-19.) Johnson's petition for 
interlocutory appeal of the Order denying Disqualification was denied. (R.1132, 1454.) 
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment 
Based on evidence discovered in the civil suit, including Myers' and Young's 
depositions, Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on December 29, 2006. (R. 895-96,1076-
1102.) The grounds for the Motion were: (1) prosecutorial misconduct deprived Johnson of 
his due process rights to a fair trial; (2) Section 61-1-1 was not applicable; and (3) insufficient 
evidence existed to meet each element of Section 61-1-1. (Id.) The State opposed the 
Motion to Dismiss and filed a countermotion to strike Johnson's Motion wherein the State 
once again argued Johnson violated Section 61-1-1 by failing to affirmatively disclose "all 
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material facts." (R. 1113.) The Court denied Johnson's Motion to Dismiss by Order dated 
February 27, 2007 on the grounds (1) the prosecutorial misconduct alleged by Defendant did 
not warrant dismissal; (2) sufficient evidence existed for trial and (3) the issues of law raised 
by defendant are properly considered through jury instructions and at trial. (R. 1321-22; 
attached as Add. C.) Johnson filed a petition for interlocutory appeal of this Order and a stay 
of criminal proceedings, both of which were denied.3 (R. 1131, 1162,1373, 1456.) 
Johnson filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on February 8, 2007 regarding 
the proper legal interpretation of Section 61-1-1(2). (R.1201-15.) The State did not respond, 
but the trial court denied the motion by Order dated March 5, 2007 on the grounds that it 
already addressed these issues in the Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. (R. 1371-72.) 
Trial 
Following each parties' submission of proposed jury instructions and motions in 
limine, a jury trial was conducted from March 5, 2007 through March 7, 2007. (R. 1145-55, 
1271-73, 1277-1302, 1428-49.) During the trial, the State continued to insist (including 
through Mr. Hines), over Johnson's objection, that Section 61-1-1(2) required Johnson to 
affirmatively disclose "all material facts" to Young and Myers, as opposed to the language of 
the statute which requires Johnson to disclose material facts necessary to make a statement 
actually made not misleading. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). Johnson's objections were 
overruled, and his requests for curative jury instructions were denied. (R. 1999:42-43, 47, 49, 
3
 On January 17, 2007, Johnson's attorney, Joe Cartwright, obtained permission to 
withdraw. (R. 1164-65.) Aside from limited representation for the Disqualification Motion, 
Johnson represented himself pro se in all proceedings up to and including trial. Following 
trial, Johnson hired counsel, including the present firm to represent him in all further 
proceedings before the trial court (R. 1464-65,1495-96.) 
-8-
51-53, 56-57, 106-07; R. 1663.) At the close of the State's case, Johnson renewed his motion 
to dismiss the case as a matter of law on the grounds Section 61-1-1 was inapplicable, which 
was denied. (R. 1999:268-90; attached as Add. D.) After a lengthy deliberation, the jury 
returned a verdict of "Guilty." (R. 1451.)4 
Post-Trial Proceedings 
The trial court ordered Adult Probation and Parole to prepare a presentence report 
and Johnson was ultimately sentenced on June 6, 2007. (R. 1462, 1612-14.) Prior to 
sentencing, Johnson filed a motion for arrest of judgment under Utah R. Crim. P. 23. (R. 
1506-48.) The Court denied Johnson's motion and sentenced Johnson, including, but not 
limited to, one year in jail/home confinement in lieu of commitment to prison. (R. 1677-80.) 
A sentence, judgment and commitment was entered July 2, 2007. (R. Id) 
Johnson filed a Motion for a New Trial under Utah R. Crim. P. 24 on June 20, 2007. 
The grounds were, inter alia: (1) Mr. Hines' improper and confusing testimony concerning 
the requirements of Section 61-1-1; (2) as applied to the facts of this case, Section 61-1-1 is 
unconstitutionally vague; (3) cumulative error; (4) recent discovery of new evidence; and (5) 
the judgment that Johnson committed a second degree felony is not supported by the 
evidence because Johnson did not "obtain or sought to have obtained" value in excess of 
$10,000. (R. 1621-10.) The trial court denied the Motion for a New Trial by Memorandum 
Decision dated October 10, 2007. (1964-79, attached as Add. E[) 
Defendant sought a restitution hearing pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 21A. Restitution 
4
 Although Johnson requested the trial exhibits to be transmitted with the appellate 
record on September 16, 2008, none were provided. See Request For Transmission of 
Exhibits in the Court of Appeals file/docket. 
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hearings were held October 10 and 24, 2007. The Court ruled on December 5, 2007 that 
Johnson was not the cause of loss of the dairy farm (which had been foreclosed due to the 
dairymen's failure to pay a preexisting mortgage loan), but should pay $120,000 in restitution 
to Myers and Young as the proximate cause of a $50,000 trust deed and a $70,000 C D . 
"lost" by Myers and Young. (R. 2032-42, attached as Add. F.) 
Johnson filed his notice of appeal on November 8, 2007. (R. 2000-02.) 
Johnson filed a Renewed Motion for a New Trial ("Renewed Motion") on November 
14, 2007 based on new evidence adduced at the restitution hearings establishing a jury could 
not have convicted Johnson of securities fraud constituting a second degree felony on 
evidence showing less than $10,000 worth of value. (R. 2003-12.) The trial court denied the 
Renewed Motion by Minute Entry dated February 11, 2008, instructing the State to prepare 
a final order. (R. 2074.) A Final Order on the Renewed Motion was entered August 12, 
2008. (Add. G.) Johnson filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on August 19, 2008. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Dairymen Jim Young and Ron Myers owned a limited liability company 
named Milk King Dairy, LLC ("Milk King" or the "LLC"). The LLC owned and operated a 
dairy farm and equipment before August 9, 2000. (R. 1999:122-23, 170-71.) 
2. Young was the managing member of the LLC responsible for its day-to-day 
operations (R. 1999:213-14, Sale Agreement, p. 4, R. 314-19, attached as Add. H.) 
3. At the time the parties first met, a substantial mortgage loan, far exceeding the 
value of the collateral, existed from Central Bank to the LLC that was secured by the LLC's 
dairy farm and guaranteed by Young and Myers. (R.1999:176, 178, 215; 2075:143-44, 146-
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48,156-57.) Also, the LLC's farming equipment was heavily encumbered as collateral for 
security interests. (See Fact No. 33, below.) All of the LLC's and Myers and Young's loans 
were periodically in default prior to the events at issue. (R. 2075:102-04,110, 116-19,121-
23,126; R. 2075, October 24, 2007, p.4;5 Restitution Exhibits 3-5, 10,18-19.) 
4. Milk prices were falling in the late 1990's and in 2000 and, as a result, the LLC 
and its dairy operations were struggling financially. Young and Myers were seeking additional 
financing for their LLC's dairy operations. (R. 1999:124-25, 214-15; R. 2075(2d):4.) Young 
and Myers had been rejected for financing by banks and private lenders. (R. 1999:180.) 
5. Young was introduced to A. Paul Schwenke by a cattle reseller, Duane Bitton. 
Young agreed to attend a meeting in Fillmore, Utah in July 2000 with Bitton, Schwenke, and 
other persons not known to Young at the time. (R. 1999:124-25.) 
6. Defendant Johnson had a business transaction with Victor Lawrence prior to 
July 2000. As a result of acts of Lawrence, Johnson lost some 75 cows and liens on cows in 
this business transaction. (1999:300-01; 348-350.) 
7. In July 2000, Lawrence asked Johnson to attend a meeting in Fillmore, Utah 
with him as a means to settle Johnson's claims against Lawrence. Lawrence represented that 
the meeting would include a cattle reseller—Bitton, Schwenke and some dairymen. 
Lawrence further represented that through this meeting, it could be possible to move 
Johnson's cows to a new dairy. Lawrence drove Johnson to the July 2000 meeting, where 
they joined it already in progress. (R. 1999:302-03; 349.) 
5
 There are two transcripts for the Restitution Hearings held October 10 and October 
24, 2007. Both are marked as R. 2075, although the pagination within the two is not 
continuous. Accordingly, the record cite for the October 24, 2007 hearing will be referred to 
as "R. 2075(2d)" in this brief. 
-11-
July 2000 Meeting 
8. When Johnson and Lawrence arrived at the July 2000 meeting, Young, 
Schwenke, Bitton, and some other persons from Lawrence's law office were present. (R. 
1999:126; 302-303.) Myers was not present at the July 2000 meeting (R. 1999:126, 131,188.) 
9. Prior to the July 2000 meeting, Lawrence and Schwenke incorporated 
American Dairy.com, Corp., a Utah Corporation (the "Corporation" or "American Dairy"). 
Johnson was not involved in this incorporation. There were no bylaws for the corporation, 
resolutions, elected officers or bank account for American Dairy. (R. 1999:318; 327-29.) 
10. At the July 2000 meeting, Schwenke outlined a plan for financing that 
involved pooling cows from several dairies into a single corporation, American Dairy. 
According to Young's trial testimony, Schwenke's plan was: 
to get several cows like 10-15,000 cows, a lot of cows. He wanted to basically 
have a, open a public company, he wanted to sell stocks in Americandairy.com 
and a, [sic] that was where he was, he was going to get public financing with 
using Americandairy.com. 
(R. 1999:127.) After sufficient cows and/or dairies were secured, Schwenke intended to go 
online with American Dairy and show investors their cows over the internet with cameras to 
attract further investors and financing. (R. 1999:176) Young also testified that Schwenke 
represented he had $10,000,000 in assets he planned to invest. (R. 1999:164-66.) Johnson 
never represented he was putting any of his assets towards the deal. (R. 1999:166.) 
11. Johnson had not spoken with Schwenke about this plan and did not know of 
it prior to the July 2000 meeting. Johnson had no role in creating the concept. (R. 1999:303.) 
12. According to Young, Johnson was introduced by Schwenke at the July 2000 
meeting as a "stock expert." (R. 1999:127-28.) At Schwenke's request, Johnson explained a 
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little bit about how stocks would work in a public company, but Young was unable to recall 
any specific information provided by Johnson. (R. 1999:127-30.) Young further testified 
that Johnson and/or Schwenke disclosed there were risks in any stock transaction, but did 
not elaborate on these risks, although Young asked no questions. (R. 1999:146,154.) 
13. At the July 2000 meeting, Young was told by unidentified persons that stock 
in American Dairy "wasn't worth anything then," but "the ideas is that it would be worth 
something" at some point in the future. (R. 1999:147-48.) 
14. After the July 2000 meeting, Young met with Myers alone to discuss 
Schwenke's plan. They did not discuss Johnson or Schwenke's description of Johnson as a 
"stock expert." (R. 1999:131-32,135-36.) After their discussion, Young and Myers set up 
another meeting with Schwenke in Salt Lake City on August 2, 2000. (Id.) 
August 2. 2000 Meeting 
15. The August 2, 2000 meeting with Schwenke, Myers and Young took place in 
Salt Lake City, at Lawrence's office. Johnson was not initially present or aware of the 
meeting. (R. 1999:136, 216, 307, 350.) 
16. At the meeting, Schwenke presented Myers and Young with a draft of a Stock 
Purchase/Trade Agreement ("Draft Agreement").6 (R. 1999:137.) Lawrence drafted the 
Draft Agreement, without Johnson's involvement. (R. 1999:308, 318, 322.) 
17. Young, Myers and Schwenke then went downstairs in the building with the 
Draft Agreement to Johnson's office. (R. 1999:308.) According to Myers, Schwenke 
introduced Johnson as a securities expert who had worked in New York and who was a 
6
 No copy of the Draft Agreement appears to exist and is thus not in the record. The 
representations regarding the Draft Agreement come from the parties' testimonies. 
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high-powered lawyer. (R. 1999:217.) Young also stated Schwenke introduced Johnson as an 
attorney specializing in securities law. (R. 1999:153-54.) 
18. Johnson was in fact an attorney at all relevant times to this transaction. 
However, as stipulated at trial: 
[F]rom late July to early August of 2000 defendant, Johnson was subject to 
disciplinary proceedings before the Utah State bar alleging misappropriation 
of client funds from an event which occurred in October 1992, but which had 
not been finalized as of August 9th, 2000, and that defendant Johnson was in 
August of 2000 a lawyer in good standing licensed to practice law in the State 
of Utah. 
(R. 1999:267.) Johnson did not disclose this disciplinary proceeding to Myers or Young. 
19. Johnson did not act as an attorney for any party or advise any party as an 
attorney on the agreement. Neither Young, Myers nor Schwenke regarded Johnson as their 
attorney nor American Dairy's attorney. (R. 1999:182-83, 186-87, 220-221, 303.) 
20. Young testified that he would have done this deal for the LLC regardless of 
Johnson's involvement and, thus, that he did not rely on Johnson's attorney status or other 
representations in deciding whether to enter into the transaction. (R. 1999:154,179) 
21. At this August 2, 2000 meeting, according to Myers, the parties again 
discussed the LLC's dairy, Johnson's cows, and Schwenke's idea to attach internet cameras 
to the dairy and their hopes to eventually find 10-15 more dairies and 15,000 cows to do a 
cooperative or form of public offering ["IPO"] to get financing. Myers testified that 
Schwenke represented that if he could acquire the additional dairies and cows, a public 
offering of shares in that venture at $4 to $8 per share could be feasible. (R. 1999:216-18.) 
22. According to Myers' trial testimony, at Myers' request, Johnson explained the 
mechanics of how stocks and IPO's generally work. Myers asked whether he could be 
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involved in a future IPO, if and when it occurred. Myers testified that Johnson said it was 
unusual but it could be possible. (R. 1999:218-19.) 
23. Schwenke and Young testified Johnson made no representations about 
obtaining financing or about being involved in a future IPO. (R. 1999:166, 317-18.) 
24. The Draft Agreement was shown to Johnson at the August 2, 2000 meeting. 
Myers testified they wanted the Draft Agreement altered to have the ability to get the dairy 
back at some point if things did not work out, and so took it with them from the meeting. 
(R.1999:220-21.) The Draft Agreement was never executed. 
25. Following the August 2, 2000 meeting, Myers and Young presented the Draft 
Agreement to their personal attorney who added a provision to undo the transaction if: 
after a reasonable time and in no event more than two years from the time of 
this Agreement, American-diary.com, Inc. [sic] has not registered its stock for a 
public offering. 
(Sale Agreement, 1(6; (R. 1999:174-75, 220-21.) The Draft Agreement, as amended by Myers 
and Young, became the Sale Agreement executed and at issue in this case. (R. 1999:222.) 
26. Following their amendments, Young and Myers desired to do the deal and set 
up a meeting for August 9, 2000 to execute the Sale Agreement. (R. 1999:137-38, 222.) 
August 9. 2000 Meeting 
27. On August 9, 2000 Young and Myers met with Schwenke and Johnson again 
to execute the Sale Agreement. Young signed the agreement on behalf of Milk-King Farms, 
LLC. Young and Schwenke then went to Johnson's office and requested that Johnson, as a 
favor, sign the Sale Agreement and stock certificates as a temporary corporate officer. (R. 
1999:138-39,141-42, 221-223, 312-15, 318, 352; Sale Agreement, p. 4.) 
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28. At Schwenke's request, Johnson executed the Agreement as CEO of 
American Dairy and the stock certificates to Young and Myers as President. (R. 1999:313; 
Sale Agreement, p.4.) It was not believed or intended that Johnson would remain an officer 
of the corporation or be involved going forward. (R.1999:181, 186-87, 313, 329.) 
The Transaction 
29. Pursuant to the Sale Agreement, in exchange for American Dairy stock, the 
LLC paid to American Dairy the sum of $200,000 "in trade for equivalent sum representing 
equity in Milk-King Dairy, L.C. properties and equipment." (Exhibit A to Sale Agreement.) 
30. Myers received 150,000 shares and Young received 50,000 shares of American 
Dairy. Johnson signed the stock certificates on behalf of American Dairy. (R. 1999:143-44, 
223-224; Sale Agreement, Exhibit A.) There was no money exchanged. (R. 1999:183-84, 
314; Sale Agreement, Exhibit A.) Rather, for the 200,000 shares of American Dairy, Myers 
and Young provided to American Dairy: 
a. A Warranty Deed dated August 9, 2000 executed by Milk-King Farms, LLC 
transferring tide to the dairy real property from Milk-King Farms, LLC to 
American Dairy.com, Inc, both of which companies were owned by Young 
and Myers. The deed was notarized by Victor Lawrence's paralegal. (R. 
1999:144,168-70; Sale Agreement, Exhibit A.) 
b. Personal property/farming equipment listed on the Sale Agreement (Sale 
Agreement, Schedule A; specified in Fact No. 31, below.) 
31. At trial, neither Myers nor Young provided an estimate of the value of the 
dairy. (R. 1999: 148-51; 233-37.) While no supporting documentary evidence was provided 
and no consistent method of valuation used, Young estimated the value of the equipment to 
exceed $150,000, (R. 1999:148-51), whereas Myers estimated the equipment to exceed 
$200,000. (R. 1999:235-37.) Specifically, for the following equipment: 
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a. John Deere 7200 Tractor (Young: $40,000; Myers: $50,000-60,000). 
b. Schuler 4910 Vertical Mixer (Young: $22,000; Myers $50,000). 
c. Double-12 parallel milk parlor and associated equipment, including stalls, 
milking units, milk transfer equipment, milk storage, and cooling equipment 
(Young: $80,000-$90,000; Myers: $60,000-$ 100,000). 
d. Heatwatch Electronic Heat Detection System (Young: $5000; Myers: $12,000-
15,000). 
e. Old Scoopmobile LD-7 Loader (Young: $3,000; Myers: $2,000). 
f. Allis Chalmers 7030 Tractor (Young: $7,000; Myers: $5,000). 
32. In valuing the equipment, neither Young nor Myers identified loans or other 
encumbrances on the equipment. Myers testified on cross-examination that there was a 
substantial loan against the dairy by Central Bank. (R. 1999:239.) 
33. Evidence discovered at the restitution hearings established that the dairy and 
equipment transferred from the LLC to American Dairy did not have the values testified to 
by Young and Myers, but were in fact so encumbered as to be valueless. For example: 
a. The LLC's property, including both the real property and equipment, was 
subject to a blanket lien in connection with a 1998 loan from Central Bank 
(later sold) that exceeded the value of the property. (R. 2075:106,140-160; 
Restitution Hearing Exhibit 10.) 
b. UCC filing showed security interests by various creditors predating August 
2000 in all equipment and household goods. These security interests were not 
shown to be released. (R. 2075(2d):14-19; Restitution Hearing Exhibits 18-19.) 
c. A February 2002 appraisal of the dairy set its value at $135,000 "as is," which 
is what the dairy actually sold for at the Trustee's sale in 2002 after Young and 
Myers defaulted on their loans from Central Bank in October 2001. The same 
appraisal set an ideal value for the dairy operation at full capacity (which it 
never was at all relevant times) at $260,000. Debt on the dairy, including 
equipment and livestock, exceeded $500,000, including: Central Bank Trust 
Deed Note with fees $324,143.27; an IRS tax lien of $13,876.27; equipment 
loans; and a second loan to Central Bank for $116,000. (R. 2075:101-12,115-
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29,140-60; R. 2075(2d):14-19; Restitution Hearing Exhibits 3-5; 8-12,18-19.) 
d. Young and Myers grossly overstated the value of the equipment, not reflecting 
the actual value in August 2000. The equipment was subject to liens 
exceeding their value, including the blanket bank lien and purchase money 
financing from John Deere and other secured parties. For example, the 
financed John Deere Tractor and Mixer together had a dollar value not 
exceeding $31,503 when sold in an open market sale, but had debt around 
$60,000 (in addition to the blanket bank lien). (R. 2075:115-29; R. 2075(2d):14-
19, 47-49; Restitution Hearing Exhibits 4-5, 10, 18-19.) 
e. The farm equipment supposedly exchanged from the LLC to American Dairy 
and thus allegedly "obtained" by Johnson, was not ever owned by the LLC 
nor in fact conveyed to, obtained or controlled by American Dairy. The 
evidence at the Restitution Hearing—including the bankruptcy filings of 
Young, the UCC-1 filings of John Deere and other secured parties, the Central 
Bank documents, and witness testimony—demonstrated Young and Myers 
held title personally, and sold, conveyed or abandoned all equipment without 
any regard to American Dairy. (R. 2075:115-29, 200-02 ; R. 2075(2d):14-19, 
30-39, 47-49; Restitution Exhibits 3-6, 9-10, 12,18-19.) 
34. The Sale Agreement indicates there were 10,000,000 shares of American Dairy 
issued. (Sale Agreement, recital.) However, it is undisputed that Myers and Young were at 
all times the only shareholders of American Dairy. Neither Johnson, Schwenke, nor any 
other person ever held shares to American Dairy. (R.1999:168,170-71, 311, 314.) 
35. The Sale Agreement supports the undisputed evidence that Young and Myers 
were the only shareholders of American Dairy, stating American Dairy "is not a party to any 
agreement, written or oral, creating rights in respect to the Corporation's Stock in any third 
person or relating to the voting of the Corporation's Stock." (Sale Agreement, ^{3(b)(I).) 
36. Johnson did not obtain anything as a result of the Sale Agreement He 
received no compensation and no shares of American Dairy. (R. 1999:182-83, 312, 314.) 
Alleged Omissions 
37. Young testified that he could not remember any statements made by Johnson 
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that turned out not to be true, (R. 1999:153,191), but as of trial thought Johnson knew more 
than he let on and gave a false sense of security about stocks. (R. 1999:192.) Although given 
the opportunity, Young did not ask any questions prior to doing the deal. (R. 1999:154.) 
38. Myers testified there were no specific statements by Johnson that Myers found 
out not to be true. It was "[m]ore of an absence of information." (R. 1999: 232.) 
39. At trial, the State did not outline its case or, as the omission portion of the 
Section 61-1-1 requires, focus on predicate statements made by Johnson that were allegedly 
rendered misleading by material omissions. Rather, the State insisted—through both the 
testimony of its expert witness, Michael Hines, its questioning of Young and Myers, and 
during opening and closing statements—that Section 61-1-1 required Johnson to 
affirmatively disclose everything a reasonable investor would want to know prior to 
purchasing. (R. 1999:18, 530, 532). While it is not clear from the State's presentation of 
evidence, the specific alleged omissions are listed on pages 39-40, below, for economy. 
Events After the August 9T 2000 Transaction. 
40. Other than signing on August 9, 2000, Johnson had no further conversations, 
dealings or contact with Myers or Young about the operations of the dairy or the August 9, 
2000 transaction.7 (R. 1999:182-83,186-87, 317, 352; R. 2075(2d):7, 27.) 
41. After the Sale Agreement, Young and Myers executed Proxy Agreements in 
7
 A bankruptcy petition was filed from Johnson's office in May 2001 on behalf of 
American Dairy to stop the foreclosure of a $50,000 Trust Deed, prepared and given by 
Schwenke without Johnson's involvement, on the dairy real estate in October 2000. (R. 
2075(2d):55-57,67-73; Rest. Ex. 21.) When the Charles Maak, the attorney who serviced 
1998 loan originally from Central Bank (see Fact No. 33(a), supra), sent Johnson a letter 
regarding the bankruptcy and foreclosure of Central Bank's Trust Deed, Johnson responded 
saying he had no involvement in the matter and to stop sending material. (R. 2075:142-43.) 
.19. 
favor of Schwenke allowing him to vote their shares. (R.1999:151-52, 227-28, 320-22, 353.) 
The Proxy Agreements were revocable at will. (R. 1999:346.) 
42. Young and Myers continued to control all aspects of dairy operations and 
receive all proceeds therefrom in the same manner as they did prior to converting from the 
LLC to American Dairy. (R. 1999:172,184). No bank account, invoices or milk proceeds 
payments were changed. (Id.) The equipment never left the property. (Id; R. 2075(2d):6-7.) 
Myers and Young failed to continue to make payments on their preexisting loans, however, 
and the dairy and equipment were later foreclosed upon by creditors of the LLC, Myers, and 
Young. (R. 1999:176, 178; Fact No. 33, supra.) 
43. Young and Myers testified that at some point after the Sale Agreement was 
executed they lost control of the dairy. This alleged understanding was based on Young's 
request to Schwenke after the August 9, 2000 transaction for permission to lease a part of 
the farm out. Young testified that Schwenke refused. Young did not then, nor at any time, 
consult with Johnson about this request or with an attorney. (R. 1999:173, 182-83.) 
44. Neither Young nor Myers consulted with an attorney or other third parties 
about their rights as sole shareholders of American Dairy. (R. 1999:182.) According to the 
testimony of Johnson's expert witness, Nathan Drage, as sole shareholders Young and 
Myers had the exclusive legal authority to retain, fire or hire any officer or director of 
American Dairy and to revoke at will any proxies. (R. 1999:410-11, 417, 428-30.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Section 61-1-1 is not applicable to Johnson because the undisputed evidence 
showed the transaction did not involve an "offer" or "sale" of a security for value, as is 
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required, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1, -13(v), but rather constituted a change in the form 
of ownership. Myers and Young purported to exchange the assets of the LLC for the shares 
in American Dairy. However, because they were the sole members of the LLC and the sole 
shareholders in American Dairy, Myers and Young retained ownership of the LLC's assets, 
meaning their was no disposition or attempted disposition of a security for value to trigger 
Section 61-1-1 liability. Johnson received no compensation, owned no shares of American 
Dairy, and derived no economic benefit from this transaction. 
2. The State presented the Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of 
Securities, Michael Hines, as its expert witness. Mr. Hines' testimony was riddled with 
impermissible legal conclusions as to what conduct violated the Jaw in the eyes of the 
Enforcement Department. Despite objections from Johnson, the trial court did next to 
nothing to stop or cure the improper testimony. In fact, Mr. Hines' entire testimony reads 
as if it were legal argument one would expect at oral argument, not a jury trial 
The impropriety of Mr. Hines' testimony is magnified by the fact that he offered an 
incorrect legal interpretation of Section 61-1-1(2). Mr. Hines testified that Section 61-1-1(2) 
required Johnson to affirmatively disclose all information an investor would want to know, 
even though the plain language of the statute only requires such disclosure in order to render 
a statement actually made not misleading, in light of the circumstances in which it is made. 
The State repeated this incorrect interpretation of the law during opening and closing 
statements, insisting there were an "enormous amount of omissions," each of which alone 
would be sufficient to convict Johnson. The State did not specify which statements were 
rendered misleading by the omissions, however. The trial court did next to nothing to stop 
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or cure the incorrect interpretation of Section 61-1-1 by the State or its expert, even refusing 
Johnson's proffered curative instruction on the proper interpretation of the law. 
Mr. Hines' testimony was therefore unduly prejudicial, requiring reversal. The State 
should not have been allowed to have the Director for Enforcement legislate from the 
witness stand by providing an interpretation of Section 61-1-1 that is not supported by the 
statute's language. There is no question the jury would give special deference to such a 
witness's opinion on the law and, given the lack of direction by the trial court, was confused 
as to what the law was leading to an improper verdict. When the alleged omissions are 
considered in light of the correct interpretation of Section 61-1-1, they are not unlawful. 
3. The State's and its expert's improper interpretation of Section 61-1-1 is 
unconstitutional as applied to Johnson, violating both (a) due process guaranties against 
prosecution for "vague" crimes and (b) Utah's separation of powers clause. As written, 
Section 61-1-1(2) provides notice of what conduct is proscribed: a material omission that 
makes a statement made misleading, in light of the circumstances in which it is made. The 
State did not apply this statute as written, however, instead insisting Section 61-1-1(2) 
required Johnson to disclose a limitless list of everything a reasonable investor might want to 
know, even though Young testified he did not rely on Johnson's statements and would have 
done the transaction for the LLC even if Johnson were not present. Such application is 
unconstitutionally vague as it does not provide notice of what conduct violates the law and 
leads to arbitrary enforcement. The separation of powers provision of the Utah 
Constitution also precludes the Executive Department from assuming the role of the 
legislature to remove key language from the statute. The State violated this provision 
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through the prosecutor's and Mr. Hines' incorrect interpretations of Section 61-1-1(2). 
4. New evidence discovered at the restitution hearings established that the dairy 
and equipment allegedly given by Young and Myers in exchange for the shares of American 
Dairy were so encumbered as to be valueless. The trial court refused to consider this 
evidence, however, on the grounds it was available to Johnson during trial, was cumulative, 
and would not alter the verdict. This was an abuse of discretion as the evidence was in 
control of the State, who had an obligation to disclose it but did not, or Myers and Young, 
who Johnson was precluded from contacting by order of the court. It was not cumulative 
because it would have been used to impeach Myers and Young, whereas without the 
evidence they went unimpeached. It would have changed the verdict because it establishes 
there was no offer or sale "for value" and, additionally, makes Johnson's conviction for a 
second degree felony violation of Section 61-1-1, requiring $10,000 or more of unlawfully 
obtained property, see Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (2)(b), improper as a matter of law. 
5. The trial court erred in awarding restitution in the amount of $120,000 
($50,000 lost trust deed and $70,000 lost certificate of deposit "CD") because this amount 
does not result from Johnson's conviction for violation of Section 61-1-1. At best, the trust 
deed and CD were lost due to the separate criminal act of Schwenke. The amount of 
restitution is also erroneous. The evidence shows that the trust deed was not foreclosed 
upon and that Young received all monies from the loan it secured. The CD, which was given 
as security for a loan that predated the transaction at issue, was lost when Myers and/or 
Young failed to make payments on the loan. Even then, the evidence shows that at least 
$11,500 of the CD was refunded to Myers. 
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ARGUMENT 
The trial court's primary error in this case was allowing the State to impermissibly and 
redefine Utah Code Section 61-1-1 to try to fit the facts of this case in violation of the due 
process and separation of powers clauses guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. The State 
charged Johnson with violation of Section 61-1-1(2) and (3), (R.63-65), which provides: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, 
or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
* * * 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they are made? not misleading: or 
(3) engage in any act, practice or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2)-(3) (emphasis added). Jury Instruction No. 15 informed the 
jury that Johnson was charged with violating both Subsections (2) and (3). 
However, the State's theory of liability was limited to the "omission" language from 
Subsection (2). The State provided no evidence of an untrue statement of material fact by 
Johnson. In fact, both Myers and Young, the only fact witnesses offered by the State, 
testified they could not recall any statement by Johnson that turned out not to be true. (R. 
(R. 1999:153, 191, 232), Facts 37-38, supra.) 
Nor did the State provide any evidence of a "practice" or "course of business" by 
Johnson that operated "as a fraud or deceit upon any person." Both Young and Myers 
testified that Johnson's involvement was very limited, not exceeding the three meetings 
occurring in July-August 2000. (R. 1999:182-83,186-87, 317, 352; R. 2075(2d):7, 27.) 
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Moreover, while Subsection (3) also precludes any "act" that would operate as a fraud or 
deceit, because the State provided no evidence of an affirmative misrepresentation by 
Johnson, liability under Subsection (3) in this case could only result from an omission of a 
material fact that makes a statement misleading. Indeed, Jury Instruction No. 17, prepared 
by the State and given to the jury over Johnson's objection, defined "fraud" as: 
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading. 
(R. 1447.) Because the term "fraud" appears only in Subsection (3), this instruction must go 
to Subsection (3), limiting this provision's reach here to an "omission." As shown below, 
Johnson's conviction under the "omission" language of Subsection (2) was improper. 
I. THE SECURITIES FRAUD STATUTE IS NOT APPLICABLE. 
The trial court's first error was in denying Johnson's various motions to dismiss based 
on its conclusion that Section 61-1-1 applied to this case despite undisputed evidence that 
the transaction at issue was not for "value." In interpreting a statute, courts look first "to its 
plain language to determine its meaning." State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 304,^(11, 169 P.3d 
778. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4 at ^|8. 
The lead-in language for Section 61-1-1 limits its application to conduct occurring "in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1. 
Section 61-l-13(l)(v), defines "sale" and "offer." 
(v)(i) "Sale" or "sell" includes every contract for sale of, contract 
to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for 
value. 
(ii) "Offer" or "offer to sell" includes every attempt or offer to 
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or 
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interest in a security for value. 
Utah Code Ann. 61-l-13(l)(v) (emphasis added). 
In the present case, there was no offer or sale because there was no disposition or 
attempted disposition of a security "for value." The term "for value" is not defined in 
Utah's Uniform Security Act. Black's Law Dictionary defines "value," as "the estimated or 
appraised worth of any object or property, calculated in money." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1721 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). In Capital General Corp. v. Utah Department of 
Business Regulation, this Court equated "value" under the Securities Act with "economic 
benefit" and determined that a seller's gifting of securities in a public company to various 
investors was for value because it generated a market for the shares, most of which were still 
held by the distributing sellers. 777 P.2d 494, 497 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
However, in a more recent case, albeit not in the securities context, this Court 
considered whether a "sale" or "exchange" of real property occurred to trigger a contractual 
commission provision. Premier Van Schaack Realty, Inc. v. Sieg, 2002 UT App 173,1J8, 51 P.3d 
24. The Court determined that the existence of either a sale or exchange depended upon 
whether there was "consideration." Id. at l[J9. The Court concluded that there was no 
consideration, and thus no sale or exchange, because the seller transferred the property to a 
joint venture in exchange for an interest in the joint venture and thus the purported sale 
involved a mere "change in the form of ownership" of the property. Id. at ^12-14. 
The same result is required here. The undisputed evidence establishes that Myers and 
Young, the sole members of the LLC, transferred the assets of the LLC to American Dairy 
in exchange for 200,000 shares of American Dairy. There was no cash involved in the 
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transaction. Myers and Young were at all times the only shareholders of American Dairy. 
Neither Schwenke nor Johnson, for example, owned any shares of American Dairy. This 
was guaranteed in the Sale Agreement, wherein it provides: 
The Seller [American Dairy] is not a party to any agreement, whether written 
or oral, creating rights in respect to the Corporation's Stock in any third 
person or relating to the voting of the Corporation's Stock. 
(Sale Agreement, f3 (b)(1).) Myers and Young continued to operate the dairy after executing 
the Sale Agreement in the same manner as before the Agreement. (See Fact No. 42, supra) 
Moreover, as discussed in Section (IV) below, evidence adduced at the restitution hearings 
established that Myers and Young held title to the equipment personally and disposed of the 
property without regard to a purported ownership interest by American Dairy (See Fact No. 
33, supra.) and that both the dairy and equipment allegedly given to American Dairy were in 
fact so encumbered as to be valueless. (Id.) 
Accordingly, the undisputed evidence establishes that Myers' and Young's conversion 
from LLC to American Dairy was not a disposition for value, but rather was a change in the 
form of ownership. Unlike Capital General, American Dairy was not a public company and 
there were no other shareholders who stood to profit from the distribution of shares to 
Myers and Young through either cash considerations or the creation of a market. Johnson 
received no compensation or any other economic benefit from the transaction. (See Fact No. 
36.) Although a future IPO may have been discussed, no IPO was involved in the Sale 
Agreement. In fact, the Sale Agreement expressly allowed Myers and Young to undo the 
transaction if there were no IPO within two years of the Agreement. (Sale Agreement, ^6.) 
This Court must focus on the July/August 2000 transaction at issue, which clearly operated 
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only to change the form of ownership of the dairy and equipment from the LLC to 
American Dairy, both of which were wholly owned by Myers and Young. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING MR. 
HINES' IMPERMISSIBLE, INCORRECT AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL 
LEGAL TESTIMONY. 
A. An Expert Witness is Not Allowed to Provide Purely Legal Conclusions. 
The admission of expert testimony is governed by Rules 702 through 704. Rule 702 
requires the expert be qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education" in a 
particular field to render the opinion and that the opinion be "helpful" to the trier of fact. 
See U.R.E. 702; State p. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah 1993). Rule 704 precludes a witness 
from giving "'opinions that tell the jury what result to reach or give legal conclusions/" 
because '"[o]pinion testimony is not helpful to the fact finder when it is couched as a legal 
conclusion.'" State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 909, 914 (Utah App. 2007) (citations omitted). 
Additionally, "testimony that renders a legal conclusion ctend[s] to blur the separate and 
distinct responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness.'" Id. at 914-15 (citation omitted). 
There is a "danger [that] allowing expert opinion couched as a legal standard" will lead "the 
jurors [to] turn to the expert, rather than to the judge, for guidance on the applicable law." 
State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 493 (Utah App. 1992) affd 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). FinaUy, 
even if expert testimony otherwise satisfies Rules 702 and 704, it is still subject to exclusion 
under Rule 403, if the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. U.R.E. 403. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Larsen generally observed "expert testimony may be 
appropriate in securities fraud cases because the technical nature of securities is not within 
the knowledge of the average layman . . . ." Larsen, 865 at 1361 (quotations and citation 
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omitted). However, this does not give experts carte blanche to provide legal conclusions. The 
Larsen Court permitted the State's securities expert to make limited use of the term 
"materiality" as understood in the popular sense while testifying regarding information not 
disclosed to investors. Id. 1362-63. However, in State v. Tennejs9\?> P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996), this Court held the State's securities experts impermissibly "state[d] legal conclusions 
because the witnesses tie[d] their opinion to the requirements of Utah law." Id. at 756. 
Following these principles, Mr. Hines' testimony at trial should have been excluded 
upon Johnson's objections because it was riddled with impermissible legal conclusions. Mr. 
Hines is not a lawyer. Rather, Mr. Hines testified that he is the Director of Enforcement for 
the Utah Division of Securities, where he screens complaints to determine whether a 
transaction is a security and requires criminal investigation, (R. 1999:39-41, 45-46), and 
where he supervises and trains attorneys and investigators in the enforcement of securities 
laws, including how to identify fraud and securities violations. (W.:39-41.) Mr. Hines further 
testified that he was initially involved in Johnson's case as an investigator. (Id.\\\5) 
From this posture, Mr. Hines repeatedly offered the jury his opinion on the 
governing law. For example, Mr. Hines testified: 
A. (Mr. Hines] But in the area of securities caveat emptor does not apply, it is 
a seller beware market. In other words, the purchaser of a security has to rely 
totally on the truth and the total truth from whoever is selling it to them, and 
so its protected under a theory of it's called seller beware. In other words, the 
seller has to make sure that they disclose all material facts to the person that's 
purchasing that, that certificate. 
JOHNSON: Objection, that actually is a misstatement of the law (short 
inaudible, no mic). 
THE JUDGE: Well he's . . . I've qualified him as an expert That's his 
opinion. You can cross-examine him on that. 
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(R.1999:51-52). (A similar colloquy appears on pp. 32-33 of this Brief.) Other examples 
include Mr. Hines' testimony: (a) as to the "statutory purpose" of securities laws (R. 
1999:49); (b) as to the statutory categories for defining a security (Id.); (c) that "an offer or 
sale of a security . . . triggers the rules and laws" for Enforcement Department review 
(Id.:52); (d) that material facts include issues of background, credentials, credit-worthiness, 
etc. (Id.:55-56); and (e) that there are normally "two ways we [the Enforcement Department] 
see that the security statute can be violated . . . the misrepresentation of material facts or the 
omission of material facts in light of circumstances under which a statement is made not 
misleading . . .[a]nd the second is basically a course of conduct that will operate as a fraud 
against others," (i.e., the two provisions Johnson was charged with violating). (Id.:53). 
Even a cursory review of the transcript reveals that the primary purpose of Mr, 
Hines' testimony was to instruct the jury as to what conduct Mr. Hines, as Director of the 
Enforcement Department for the Utah Division of Securities, believes violates Utah's 
securities laws. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing this testimony. 
As the above-quoted colloquy indicates, the trial court's response to Johnson's 
objections was not to censure Mr. Hines' testimony or provide a timely curative instruction, 
but rather to invite Johnson to cross-examine Mr. Hines about the law. Johnson, given no 
other choice, accepted this invitation. (R. 1999:62-105.) For example, in cross-examination: 
A. [Hines] Okay. If you're an officer of a company then this is the test. 
Would a reasonable prudent investor want to know the background of the 
officers of the company in which he's been offered stock to purchase. 
Q. (Johnson] Objection. I ask him . . . Well— 
THE JUDGE: Well, you asked the question. He answered it. 
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Q. [Johnson] He answered it. Okay. And that comes out of that statute? 
A. [Hines] That would be a material fact I think to most investors. 
(R. 1999:104-05.) 
There is no question that this exchange along with Mr. Hines' other impermissible 
and often incorrect legal conclusions {see below) confused the jury as to what the applicable 
law is and blurred "the separate and distinct responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness." 
Dams, 155 P.3d 914-15. The transcript from Mr. Hines' testimony reads exactly like legal 
argument that might be expected from counsel during a hearing, rather than permissible 
testimony of a witness during a jury trial. For most of the first day of trial, the jury sat and 
listened to Mr. Hines, the prosecutor and Johnson debate what Utah' s security laws require, 
with little or no intervention by the trial court. This is an abuse of discretion.8 
B. Mr. Hines Provided an Incorrect Interpretation of the Law Which 
Increased the Impropriety of His Testimony and Confused the Jury. 
The impermissibility of Mr. Hines' testimony is magnified by the incorrect 
interpretation he gave to the law in question. The confusing nature of an impermissible legal 
opinion at trial is made more egregious when the legal opinion is incorrect. State v. Stringham^ 
957 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah App. 1998). 
In Stringham, the prosecutor "called [an] IRS agent and asked him a hypothetical 
question consisting of the exact actions of which defendant was accused." Id. "The 
prosecutor then asked the agent to give an opinion as to whether these actions were illegal." 
8
 The State continued its improper line of questioning with Johnson's expert, Nathan 
Drage, including interrogating Mr. Drage at length, over Johnson's objections, as to the 
holding of Landnth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985). (R. 1999:456-61.) 
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Id. (emphasis in original). The court held that a "legal conclusion like that offered by the IRS 
agent is not within the province of an expert witness." Id. The court went on to explain: 
Moreover, the IRS agent's legal conclusion was wrong. Many situations exist 
in which [an action like the defendant's] is not illegal. ... The [witness's] 
statement may have been generally correct... [but the area where it would 
have been correct was not an issue in the case.] Thus, the testimony could 
easily have misled the jury. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in 
admitting the IRS agent's testimony. 
Id. 
In this case, much of Mr. Hines' testimony is similarly incorrect. Mr. Hines took the 
position that Section 61-1-1(2) requires affirmative disclosure of all important facts: 
A.[Mr. Hines]: The important facts that would have to be disclosed in all 
circumstances are numerous. But the general test is is it an important 
fact that a purchaser of normal prudence would want to know before 
they make their decision. And those cover certainly financial statements of 
the entity which would include audited balance sheets, that would include the 
history of any of the control people whether they have been civilly sued, 
whether they've had administrative actions, bankruptcies and things like|] that. 
Competition in the market, conflict of interest. Necessary disclosure would 
include risk factors and there's . . . it's a very broad range. 
And if you turned it around and ask yourself what are what, what is a 
fact that a normal investor would want to know before they decide, those facts 
have to be disclosed. 
Q. [Prosecutor]: What would those kind, for example, what kind of things 
would be those factors, risk factors as you've testified? 
A. [Mr. Hines] Well, certainly risk factors would include— 
MR. JOHNSON: Objection. Relevance. Again, Your Honor, 61-1-1 does 
not require that you disclose all of these things, it just says if you make a 
disclosure it has to be accurate. And we're not talking about full disclosure 
statute. Its foundation and I— 
* # # 
THE JUDGE: Overruled. 
* * * 
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Q. [Prosecutor] Yes. What sorts of things would you be looking at looking for 
these risk factors? 
A. Well, certainly important risk factors is the business success of the control 
persons of the company, how successful they have been in their previous 
business. Risk factors would go to how much competition there is in the 
market. . . . how many people are you selling this to and how many people 
have a piece of this for their money. 
MR. JOHNSON: Judge, may I impose objections and all I ask if we could 
recite the statute that we're talking about, he's discussing now so I at least will 
k n o w . . . . 
THE JUDGE: Well, you can cross examine him on that issue. 
(R. 1999:55-57) (emphasis added). Mr. Hines' testimony is replete with similar statements, 
(R. 1999:51-52, 59-61, 62, 101,104-05,109, 485-86) as are the State's opening and closing 
statements. (R.1999:17-18, 527-28, 529-32) 
Mr. Hines' testimony provides an incorrect interpretation of Utah law. Section 61-1-
1(2) makes it unlawful in the sale or offer of securities to: 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading 
In interpreting a statute, courts look first "to its plain language to determine its 
meaning." State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 304^11, 169 P.3d 778. "While examining a 
statute's plain language, [Utah courts] do so under the presumption that the 'legislature used 
each term advisedly."' Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, statutory language may not be 
added to, corrected or revised, through interpretation. Id, The rule requiring a statute be 
interpreted and applied precisely as it is written is particularly compelling where the statute at 
issue is the charging statute in a criminal case. Both the United States and Utah Constitutions 
guarantee due process of law to each person. Utah Const, art. I, sec. 7; U.S. Const, amend. 
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XIV. Due process prohibits laws which are so vague, either as written or in application, that 
they deprive a '"person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly."' West Valley City, v. Streeter, 849 P.2d 613, 615 
(Utah Ct App. 1993) (citing Groyned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).9 
Contrary to the State's and Mr. Hines' insistence, the plain language of Section 61-1-
1(2) establishes that it is not a general disclosure statute requiring individuals involved in a 
securities transaction to disclose everything a reasonable investor might want to know. 
Rather Subsection (2) requires only that if a statement is made, (referred to herein as a 
"predicate statement"), it is unlawful to omit a material fact necessary to make that predicate 
statement not misleading, in light of the circumstances in which the predicate statement is 
made. In other words, the duty under Section 61-1-1 is to disclose facts that will ensure a 
predicate statement is not misleading, not make a predicate statement in the first place. Once 
that predicate statement is made, the speaker must disclose whatever is necessary to make 
the statement not misleading. 
Also contrary to Mr. Hines' and the State's representations, Subsection 61-1-1(2) does 
not treat officers, presidents or other so-called "control persons" differently than any other 
person. Likewise, its reach is not limited to "sellers" of securities. Rather, it applies with 
equal force to "any person." Simply put, there is no greater or lesser duty of disclosure upon 
an officer than there is upon any other seller or purchaser of securities under the statute. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Hines was permitted to testify at length as an expert that this is 
9
 Also, neither the State nor Hines, as members of the executive branch, can alter the 
language of a statute through enforcement without violating the principles of separation of 
powers secured by Article V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. (See Section III, below). 
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what the statute requires. Neither the statute nor any rule of construction supports this 
reading. Indeed, to accept the State's construction, this Court would need to take the phrase 
"necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they are made not misleading" completely out of the statute and pretend that it 
instead reads: "It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: (2) . . . omit to state a material fact[.]" This is plainly 
not what the Legislature intended. More importantly, it would leave the seller or purchaser 
guessing as to necessary disclosures, making the statute impermissibly vague. 
Furthermore, Mr. Hines' and the State's full-disclosure theory is contrary to the other 
authorities' interpretation of similar laws. As one commentator notes: 
The Section [101 of Uniform Securities Fraud Act identical to 
Utah Code Anno. § 61-1-1] only prohibits those omissions that 
cause the information conveyed to be either false or misleading. 
Therefore, as the courts occasionally point out in connection 
with Rule 10b-5, part of the basis for Section 101, a "pure" 
omission is not actionable. 
Blue Sky Law, § 10.37, Thompson West (Rel. 9. 2006); See also, e.g., Otis & Co. v. S.E.C, 106 
F.2d 579, 582 (6th Or. 1939) (construing the analogous Section 17(a)(2) of the 1933 Federal 
Securities Act and concluding, "[t]he statute did not require appellant to state every fact 
about stock offered that a prospective purchaser might like to know or that might, if known, 
tend to influence his decision, but it did require appellant not cto obtain money or property 
by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading."); Hoiving v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470,1481 
(6th Cir. 1987) (observing the similar second clause of Rule 10b-5 "prohibit[s] silence only 
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where the omitted information is necessary to prevent inaccuracy in existing disclosure," and 
thus refusing to hold Rule 10b-5 requires disclosure of all information required for 
registration statements under Rule 13e-3 because "[t]his is tantamount to incorporating the 
disclosure provisions of the securities laws into the antifraud provisions.").10 
The impact of Hines' tortured and incorrect view of the language of § 61-1-1(2) on 
Johnson is obvious and profound. Not only was the jury subjected to lengthy and 
impermissible legal-conclusion testimony, but the testimony offered was incorrect. 
Moreover, the State did not outline its theory of the case for the jury or attempt to specify 
predicate statements that were rendered misleading by material omissions. Instead, during 
closing arguments, the prosecutor relied on Mr. Hines' incorrect statements of the law to 
argue that there "were just an enormous amount of omissions" that would support a 
conviction. (R. 1999:530.) The only purported omissions specifically identified by the 
prosecutor, however, were Johnson's failure to provide Myers and Young with financing and 
background for American Dairy; Johnson's failure to tell Myers and Young that Schwenke 
no longer practices law; and Johnson's failure to tell Myers and Young that Johnson "had a 
disciplinary action." (R. 1999:530-31.) (As discussed in Section C below, none of these 
omissions are relevant or could support the verdict if the proper interpretation is given 
Section 61-1-1(2).) The prosecutor told the jury "you bet ya, you bet ya" a reasonable 
investor "would want to know that kind of information." (Id.) Between these statements 
and Mr. Hines' testimony, the jury was told they could convict Johnson if they just found 
10
 Accord State v, Warner, 564 N.E. 18, 37 (Ohio 1990); American Gen, Ins, Co, v. Equitable 
Gen, Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Va. 1980); Evmar Oil Corp, v, Getty Oil Co,, 1978 WL 1067 
(CD. Cal 1978); United States v, Yeaman, 987 F. Supp. 373, 378 (E.D.Pa. 1997). 
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one omission that a reasonable investor would find important, regardless of whether Myers 
and Young found it important, and regardless of whether it rendered a predicate statement 
made by Johnson misleading. (R. 1999:530, 532.) 
The trial court did next to nothing to cure Mr. Hines' and the State's misstatements 
of the law, despite Johnson's objections. As indicated, the trial court told Johnson he could 
cross-examine Mr. Hines and, during closing, once instructed the jury that lawyers' 
statements are not evidence. (R. 1999:534.) For the trial court to allow such misstatements 
with such minimal effort to cure was an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court committed a further error by refusing, over Johnson's objection, (R. 
1999:496) to offer Johnson's proposed curative jury instruction that affirmative disclosure of 
material facts is not required. (R. 1663; attached as Add. I.) As the Utah Supreme Court 
noted: "The purpose of giving instructions to the jurors is to assist them in understanding 
issues which they have to decide in the case. Included in a judge's duty to instruct the jury 
on the law applicable to the case is the right of the defendant to have his theory of the case 
presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798-99 
(Utah 1991) (quotations, citation and footnotes omitted). Given the breadth of the 
misstatements of law and the likelihood of jury confusion as to what the law was, the trial 
court's refusal to provide this jury instruction was an error of law requiring a new trial. 
C. Mr. Hines Testimony was Unduly Prejudicial 
Expert testimony is also subject to exclusion under Rule 403 "if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." U.R.E. 403. Under this rule, 
evidence should be excluded when there is "a reasonable concern that the tendency to 
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confuse the issues or mislead the jury outweighed the probative value of such evidence." 
State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350, 352 (Utah 1985); see also State v. Brink, 2007 UT App 353, ^ 10 n. 
3 173 P.3d 183 (holding Rule 403 precludes expert testimony that "would be a mere lecture 
to the jury, the substance of which could be adequately conveyed in a jury instruction, [as it] 
implicates the considerations of delay, waste of time, and needless presentation of evidence" 
protected by Rule 403). 
Johnson did not object at trial to Mr. Hines' testimony on Rule 403 grounds. 
However, Johnson relied on Rule 403 in attempting to exclude Mr. Hines' impermissible 
legal conclusions through a pretrial motion in limine, (R. 1145-55), which appears to have 
been denied in an unsigned minute entry ruling. (R. 1313-14.) 
Assuming, however, that Johnson's failure to contemporaneously object at trial leads 
to a plain error analysis, this test is met. Plain error has three elements: "(1) error; (2) 
obviousness; and (3) prejudice " State v. Tetrney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct App. 1996). 
First, as detailed above, it was error for the trial court to allow Mr. Hines' prolonged 
testimony of inadmissible and incorrect legal conclusions. Second, these errors, particularly 
in light of Johnson's consistent objections and pretrial motions on these issues, should have 
been obvious to the trial court. See id. (finding the trial court's admission of legal 
conclusions by expert were obvious error for the plain error test, even though it was not 
shown the expert's legal conclusions were erroneous). 
Finally, the error prejudiced Johnson. Mr. Hines' testimony has low probative value 
because it confused the jury as to what the law was and where to look for guidance. It was 
the Court's duty to correcdy instruct the jury on the law. 
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Conversely, the prejudice caused by this testimony was great. Mr. Hines is the 
Director for Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities. He investigated Johnson's 
case, but was not a fact witness. From this posture, Mr. Hines rendered his opinion as to 
what conduct constitutes a violation of the Utah securities laws in the eyes of the 
Enforcement Department for the Utah Division of Securities. Certainly the jury would give 
special attention to the Director's opinion as to what the law requires and what conduct 
violates the law, even if it's the wrong one. This is particularly true where the trial court 
failed to correct the errors. Moreover, the State did not focus either its presentation or 
summation of evidence on predicate statements rendered misleading by an omission. 
Rather, the State repeatedly informed the jury that Johnson needed to disclose everything a 
reasonable investor would want to know, regardless of the existence of a predicate 
statement. (R. 1999:17-18, 527-28, 529-32.) It is impossible to tdll from the verdict which 
alleged omissions the jury may have relied on or whether the jury erroneously convicted 
Johnson based upon Mr. Hines' and the State's erroneous insistence that Johnson had an 
affirmative duty to disclose everything. 
For example, the State offered the following alleged omissions during trial: 
1. Johnson failed to disclose to Young and/or Myers that he had three tax liens 
recorded against his property prior to the July/August 2000 transaction at issue. (R. 
1403; R. 1999:267.) 
2. Johnson failed to disclose to Young and/or Myers that the Small Business 
Administration ("SBA") obtained a civil judgment against Johnson prior to the 
July/August 2000 transaction at issue. (R. 1403; R. 1999:267.) 
3. No corporate or financial statements for American Dairy were provided to Myers or 
Young. (R. 1999:155-57,161, 230.) It is undisputed that no such information 
existed. (R. 1999:328-29.) 
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4. Specific risk information was not provided. (R. 1999:145-46,161, 225, 230, 232.) 
Young testified that Johnson and/or Schwenke disclosed there were risks in all stock 
transactions, but was unable to recall specific risks discussed. (R. 1999:145-46.) 
5. Johnson was represented to Young and/or Myers as a Salt Lake Attorney, with Wall 
Street experience. (R. 1999:153-54, 217.) Although Johnson was an attorney in good 
standing at the time, Johnson failed to disclose to Young and/or Myers that he was 
subject to discipline. (R. 1999:267.) 
6. Johnson failed to disclose to Young and/or Myers that Schwenke was a disbarred 
attorney. (R. 1999:530.) 
7. Schwenke represented to Young and/or Myers, when Johnson was present, that 
shares of American Dairy could be worth anywhere from $4 to $8 after an IPO at 
some point in the future. (R. 1999:230-31, 527.) 
Even assuming the jury believed these omissions occurred, they cannot support 
Johnson's conviction for violation of Section 61-1-1(2). Because Section 61-1-1(2) does not 
impose an affirmative duty of disclosure on Johnson, Johnson's conviction could not 
properly be based on Nos. 1-4. The State never alleged or provided any evidence of a 
qualifying predicate statement made misleading by these omissions. 
The remaining alleged omissions are also inadequate. Regarding No. 5, the predicate 
statement would be that Johnson was a Salt Lake attorney with Wall Street experience. It is 
undisputed that Johnson was an attorney with Wall Street experience. The State may argue 
this was rendered misleading because when the statement was made, Johnson was subject to 
disciplinary proceedings from a 1992 incident which he did not disclose. However, as the 
parties' stipulation at trial establishes, in "August 2000" Johnson was "a lawyer in good 
standing licensed to practice law in the State of Utah." The proceedings were not final and 
may have ultimately been dismissed. Moreover, both Young and Myers testified they did not 
consider Johnson their's or American Dairy's attorney. (R. 1999:182-83,186-87, 220-221.) 
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Most importantly, Young, who was in control of management of the LLC and signed 
the Sale Agreement on behalf of the LLC, testified that he would have done this deal for the 
LLC regardless of Johnson's involvement. (R. 1999:154, 179). If Johnson's involvement was 
irrelevant to the LLC's decision to enter into the transaction, then anything Johnson said or 
did not say was likewise irrelevant and could not be material.11 
Regarding No. 6, although the State argued at closing that Schwenke was a disbarred 
attorney, it presented no evidence that Johnson made a statement to Myers and Young that 
Schwenke was an attorney in good standing or that Johnson knew Schwenke was disbarred 
at the time of the transaction, making the State's reliance on this matter at closing as an 
omission by Johnson improper. 
Regarding No. 7, any discussion about a future IPO did not obligate Johnson to 
disclose all information required in an IPO transaction during the July/August 2000 
transaction at issue. No party—not Johnson, Schwenke, Young or Myers—intended or 
believed that the August 9, 2000 Sale Agreement constituted an IPO. This is clear from the 
language of the Sale Agreement, in a provision independently added by Young and Myers, 
stating that Young and Myers have the right to undo the transaction if: 
after a reasonable time and in no event more than two years from the time of 
this Agreement, American-diary.com, Inc. [sic] has not registered its stock for a 
public offering. 
11
 Johnson acknowledges the existence of Utah law that the State need not prove the 
purchaser "relied" on a particular statement to establish liability under Section 61-1-1(1). See 
State p. Facer, 552 P.2d 110, 112 (Utah 1976). However, this authority is inapplicable. 
Johnson was not charged with violation of Subsection (1). The lack of reliance here goes to 
relevance and, as discussed in Section III below, constitutionality. It is one thing to say the 
State need not prove reliance, but it is quite another to say the State can obtain a conviction 
notwithstanding the fact that the alleged victim expressly did not rely on the statement 
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(Sale Agreement, J^6.) Both Myers and Young testified that all IPO discussions involved a 
contingent future event—//'American Dairy could acquire enough cows and dairies. (R. 
1999:127, 176, 218-19.) Young testified he was told at the time of the transaction that the 
shares in American Dairy were not "worth anything then." (R. 1999:147-48.) No obligation 
arose from these musings as to the future. Cf. Warner Comm. v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482, 
1491 (D.C. Del. 1984) ("It is well established that the federal securities laws do not impose a 
duty to disclose information regarding current or future plans that are uncertain and 
contingent in nature."); accord Reiss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d 
Ck.1983); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 398 (8th Cir.1976). 
Accordingly, it is clear that Hines' improper and incorrect legal conclusions, coupled 
with the trial court's refusal to provide Johnson's curative instruction, greatly and unduly 
prejudiced Johnson. The jury was repeatedly informed during Mr. Hines' testimony and 
during closing that they only needed to find an omitted material fact, without regard for 
whether it rendered any predicate statements misleading. The alleged omissions do not 
support Johnson's conviction if the proper statutory standard is applied. 
III. UTAH CODE SECTION 61-1-1(2) WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
APPLIED TO JOHNSON. 
Utah Code Section 61-1-1 is unconstitutional as applied to Johnson in this case 
because it is both unconstitutionally vague and contrary to the separation of powers clause. 
A. Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied. 
Article I, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution provides, "No person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." The Utah Supreme Court construed 
this phrase in West Valley City v. Streeter, 849 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah App. 1993): 
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It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void 
for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague 
laws offend several important values. First, because we assume 
that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, 
we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he 
may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not 
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit 
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant 
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. . . . 
Id (citing Groyned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104,108-09 (1972)); see U.S. p. Farris, 614 F.2d 
634, 642 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The rule against vague criminal statutes guards against 'trapping 
the innocent' and delegation of criminological policy decisions to nonlegislative bodies."). 
Johnson does not contend that Section 61-1-1 is vague on its face, but as applied. As 
discussed, the State both before and throughout trial applied an incorrect theory and 
interpretation of Section 61-1-1(2) that informed the jury they could convict Johnson for 
failure to affirmatively disclose all facts. This interpretation of Section 61-1-1(2) leads to 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement that is contrary to what the Legislature intended. 
Section 61-1-1(2), as written, requires proof of a material omission that renders a predicate 
statement misleading, in light of the circumstances in which it is made. So phrased and 
applied, this statute allows an offeror or seller of securities to evaluate his or her own 
statements to determine if a particular omission makes that statement misleading. The 
omission could then be corrected to comport with the law. However, if, as the State 
insisted, the offeror or seller is simply required to disclose everything a "reasonable investor" 
would find important, the offeror's or seller's liability is potentially limidess. It is impossible 
-43-
to determine when one has disclosed everything, leaving the State with unfettered discretion 
to, as in this case, arbitrarily designate anything unsaid as a violation of Section 61-1-1, 
regardless of whether the alleged omissions rendered any predicate statement misleading or 
were important to the actual parties to the transaction. 
The present case highlights how the State's interpretation leads to arbitrary 
enforcement Young testified he did not rely on Johnson's statements but would have signed 
the Sale Agreement for the LLC regardless of Johnson's presence or involvement. 
(R.1999:154, 179). Thus, Johnson's alleged omissions were not relevant to the transaction or 
material to the parties involved in the transaction. However, under the State's interpretation, 
this did not matter. The State told the jury to speculate on what a hypothetical "reasonable 
investor" might want to know; anything omitted violated the law. Johnson cannot be 
expected to guess what an ad hoc fact finder not involved in the transaction might want to 
know. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987), superceded by statute on other grounds, 
("There are no constructive offenses; and before one can be punished, it must be shown that 
his case is plainly within the statute." (quotations and citation omitted)). 
Indeed, injury Instruction No. 18, submitted by the State over Johnson's objection 
(R. 1357; 1999:496), the jury was advised: 
One of the allegations against the Defendant in the Charge addressed in 
Count 1, is that the Defendant, either directly or indirectly, made an untrue 
statement of material fact, or omitted to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading. 
Under this theory, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the 
individual investor believed the statements to be true, nor that he relied 
upon the statements in his decision making process, so long as the 
statements were made such that a reasonable person in similar circumstances 
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would have relied upon the statements in making an investment decision. 
(R.1448) (emphasis added). This instruction invites the jury to ignore Young's testimony 
and instead substitute its own judgment of what information is important. This is not 
constitutional. It is one thing to say the State need not prove reliance, but it is quite another 
to say a conviction can be obtained despite testimony from those involved that there was no 
reliance. Due process precludes prosecution for a "constructive offense." McNallyy supra. 
B. Violation of Separation of Powers. 
The State's and Mr. Hines' attempts to interpret Section 61-1-1(2) as a general 
disclosure statute also violate the principles of separation of powers. "The powers of the 
government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the 
Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any function 
appertaining to either of the others . . . ." Utah Const, art. V, sec. 1. "The Legislative power 
of the State shall be vested in . . . a senate and House of Representatives which shall be 
designated the Legislature of the State of Utah." Id. at art. VI, sect. 1; accord State v. Gallion, 
572 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977) ("In essence, Article V, Section 1 is not directed towards the 
delegation of legislative powttperse but proscribes the conferring of legislative functions on 
specified persons in the executive department to avert any potentiality for tyranny by 
concentrating power in these individuals.") 
Here, the State, through the testimony of Mr. Hines as Director of Enforcement for 
the Utah Division of Securities, has usurped the role of the legislature to redefine essential 
elements from Section 61-1-1(2). It is improper for a member of the executive branch to 
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testify as to what he believes the law is because, by doing so, he becomes the legislature. The 
Utah Uniform Securities Act does not delegate any authority to the State to delete most of 
the language of Section 61-1-1(2) in practice. Nor can it be said that such delegation may be 
inferred because the Legislature does not know how to specifically define what must be 
disclosed to purchasers of securities when it believes full disclosure should be required. For 
example, the Legislature has set forth specific standards in Section 61-1-8 to define what 
must be included in registration statements. If the Legislature wanted to require complete 
disclosure under the anti-fraud provision of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, it knew how 
and could easily have done so by reiterating Section 61-1-8(2) in Section 61-1-1. That it did 
not is overwhelming evidence that this is not what the Legislature intended. If the State is 
dissatisfied with Section 61-1-1(2) as it is written, it may petition the Legislature to amend it. 
The State cannot, consistent with the Constitution, amend and expand the statute by having 
its agents testify and argue that the statute really means something different than what it 
states. SeeMcNally, 483 U.S. at 360; United States v. Brady, 13 F.3d 334, 340 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(holding the government cannot expand the language of the statute to apply to conduct not 
criminalized by the Congress in the statute). 
IV. JOHNSON IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE NEW 
EVIDENCE FROM THE RESTITUION HEARING ESTABLISHES 
THAT THE DAIRY AND EQUIPMENT HAD N O VALUE. 
The jury convicted Johnson of second degree securities fraud, in violation of Utah 
Code Sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 (2)(b)(i), meaning that the jury must have found 
Johnson willfully violated Section 61-1-1(2) and "at the time the crime was committed, the 
property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 
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or more." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (2)(b)(i). The only evidence as to value presented at 
trial was (1) the Sale Agreement stating "the Purchaser shall pay to the Seller the sum of Two 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000) in trade for the equivalent sum representing equity in 
Milk-King Dairy, L.C, properties and equipment" (R. 318, Ex. A to the Sale Agreement); (2) 
Young's testimony estimating the value of the LLC's equipment at $150,000, (R. 1999:148-
51); Myers' testimony estimating the equipment to exceed $200,000. (R. 1999:235-37.) 
Neither Myers nor Young provided an estimated value for the dairy real property. No 
documents supporting any of the value estimates were submitted by the State. 
From evidence provided by the State for and during the Restitution Hearings, 
Johnson discovered that Myers' and Young's value estimates at trial were grossly overstated 
and failed to account for debt on the property that far exceeded its value. For example (See 
Fact No. 33, supra for record cites and more detailed explanations): 
• The LLC's property, including both the real property and equipment, was subject 
to a blanket lien in connection with a 1998 loan from Central Bank (later sold) 
that exceeded the value of the property. 
• UCC filing showed security interests by various creditors predating August 2000 
in all equipment and household goods. 
• A February 2002 appraisal of the dairy set its value at $135,000 "as is," which is 
what the dairy actually sold for at the Trustee's sale in 2002 after Young and 
Myers defaulted on their loans from Central Bank in October 2001. Debt on the 
dairy, including equipment and livestock, exceeded $500,000, including: Central 
Bank Trust Deed Note with fees $324,143.27; an IRS tax lien of $13,876.27; 
equipment loans; and a second loan to Central Bank for $116,000. 
• Young and Myers grossly overstated the value of the equipment, not reflecting the 
actual value in August 2000. The equipment was subject to liens exceeding their 
value, including the blanket bank lien and purchase money financing from John 
Deere and other secured parties. 
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• The farm equipment supposedly exchanged from the LLC to American Dairy and 
thus allegedly "obtained" by Johnson, was not ever owned by the LLC nor in fact 
conveyed to, obtained or controlled by American Dairy. The evidence at the 
Restitution Hearing—including the bankruptcy filings of Young, the UCC-1 
filings of John Deere and other secured parties, the Central Bank documents, and 
witness testimony—demonstrated Young and Myers held tide personally, and 
sold, conveyed or abandoned all equipment without regard to American Dairy. 
Following discovery of this new evidence, Johnson filed his Motion for a New Trial 
and Renewed Motion for a New Trial on the grounds that, had the jury known of this new 
evidence, it would not have convicted Johnson of (a) a violation of Section 61-1-1(2) because 
it likely would have found there was no offer or sale of a security "for value"; or (b) a second 
degree felony under Section 61-1-21 (2)(b) because it could not have found Johnson obtained 
or sought to obtain anything "worth $10,000 or more." (R. 1642-47, 1652-53; 2008-12.) 
The trial court denied both Johnson's Motion for a New Trial and Renewed Motion 
on the grounds that, inter alia, Johnson failed to establish the grounds for a new trial based 
on newly discovered evidence. This ruling was an abuse of discretion. 
The legal standard to be applied when considering a motion for a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence is threefold: In order to constitute 
grounds for a new trial the evidence must (1) ... be such as could not with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial; (2) ... not 
be merely cumulative; [and] (3) ... be such as to render a different result 
probable on the retrial of the case. 
State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222,^49, 112 P.3d 1252 (alterations in original) (quotations 
and citation omitted). Each of these elements are met here. 
First, Johnson could not reasonably have discovered and produced the new evidence 
at trial. The trial court ruled that Johnson could have discovered the valuation evidence 
prior to trial because he was aware of the charges and the type of evidence the State would 
present as of October 24, 2005 (the preliminary hearing). (Order Denying New Trial, p. 14.) 
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Contrary to the trial court's ruling, Johnson did all he could to discover evidence prior to 
trial. The valuation evidence was in the State's, Myers' and/or Young's possession and 
control. Johnson requested discovery from the State pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 16, (R. 
23-25), but this information was not provided prior to trial despite the State's ongoing duty 
to supplement. See Utah R. Crim. P. 16(b). Johnson was also precluded from making any 
attempt to contact Myers and Young either directly or indirectly by the No Contact Order 
entered September 25, 2006. (R. 639-40.) Johnson could not reasonably have been expected 
to violate this Order to obtain discovery. Indeed, in a Request for Court Review and Action 
on Subpoenas filed by the State on September 13, 2007, the State argued Johnson violated 
this Order when he attempted to subpoena Myers and Young for this information prior to 
the Restitution Hearings. (R. 1914-19.) Furthermore, although the State bears the burden of 
proving each element of the offense at trial, and knew it intended to call Myers and Young 
to testify as to the value of the property, it apparendy made no effort to obtain documents 
supporting Myers' and Young's value estimates prior to trial. Instead, in the September 13, 
2007 Request, the State represented it had just received the information. (R. 1914-15.) If the 
State was unable to recover the information in time for trial, how could Johnson? 
Second, contrary to the trial court's ruling, this evidence was not merely cumulative. 
It would have direcdy impeached Young's and Meyer's valuation trial testimony, which went 
virtually uncontested because Johnson did not have this information prior to or during trial. 
Finally, a different result would likely follow on retrial with the evidence. Utah courts 
are "very strict in requiring affirmative proof of value, especially when the value alleged is 
close to the line dividing one offense from another." State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 284 (Utah 
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Ct App. 1996) (quotations and citation omitted). '"[A] fact which distinguishes a violation 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year from a violation punishable by 
imprisonment for ten years cannot be permitted to rest upon conjecture or surmise/" 
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). "'[T]he market-value test [is] the appropriate test to 
be used in determining the value of stolen property not otherwise provided for in our 
statute.'" Id. (citation omitted). "Market value" is defined as "fair market value at the time 
and place where the alleged crime was committed" and "fair market value" means "what the 
owner could expect to receive, and the amount a willing buyer would pay to the true owner 
for the stolen item." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). "Under this definition, purchase 
price alone is generally not sufficient to prove the value of goods on the date they were 
stolen," particularly when they "were purchased substantially prior to the theft." Id. 
Myers5 and Young's valuation testimony runs afoul of these principles. At trial, 
Myers and Young, at the prosecutor's request and over Johnson's objections, provided 
"rough estimates" of the value of the equipment that were based entirely on speculation 
without documentary support. (R. 1999:149-51, 235-37.) Myers and Young failed to use a 
consistent valuation methodology, shifting between purchase price and replacement value. 
(Id) No attempt was made to establish market value consistent with the above definition. 
Moreover, the new evidence above establishes that the property at issue was so 
encumbered as to be valueless. The trial court determined in the Restitution Order that the 
evidence showed the dairy real property was totally encumbered and was not lost due to 
Johnson's actions, but due to Myers' and Young's failure to pay the loan. (Restitution 
Order, p. 8.) Farm equipment is fungible, and may be purchased on the market easily. No 
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reasonable person, let alone a "willing buyer" would pay anything for a tractor with, for 
instance, a $30,000 debt and a $4,000 "price tag," and which might be repossessed at any 
time—particularly when a comparable tractor could be purchased that was debt free. 
More importandy, all of the equipment was actually owned, controlled and disposed 
of by Young and Myers personally, rather than American Dairy. (See Fact 33(e).) There is no 
evidence Johnson obtained anything personally and, because he had no shares of American 
Dairy, never even indirecdy "sought to obtain" this property. If the jurors had the true 
economic situation shown at the Restitution Hearing presented to them at trial instead of the 
misleading $150,000-$200,000 "replacement value-purchase price," it seems indisputable that 
the jurors could not have found anything "worth" $10,000 to meet Section 61-1-21 (2)(b) or, 
indeed, an exchange of any value at all. Thus, Johnson is entitled to a new trial. 
V, THE RESTITUTION AWARD WAS ERRONEOUS. 
The trial court ruled that Johnson was not the cause of loss of the dairy farm (which 
had been foreclosed due to the dairymen's failure to pay the mortgage loan they were 
obligated on), but should pay $120,000 in restitution based on a erroneous finding that 
Johnson was the proximate cause of economic loss to Young and Myers. The trial court 
based the $120,000 figure upon findings that (a) Johnson's actions enabled Schwenke to 
obtain a $50,000 trust deed against the dairy and (b) Johnson's actions enabled Schwenke to 
bring 200 extra head of cattle to the dairy, which were cared for by Myers and Young, and 
which care-costs caused Myers to default on a 1999 loan from Central Bank and lose a 
$70,000 CD securing the loan. (Restitution Order, p.8.) These rulings are errors of law. 
Utah Code Section 76-3-201(4) provides, "[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal 
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activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (2008); see also id, § 77-38a-302(l) (same). Section 77-38a-101, 
et seq., the "Restitution Act," defines the criteria and standard for restitution awards, with 
Section 302 listing the criteria the court is to follow. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201 (4)(b); 
77-38a-302. Section 77-38a-102 defines relevant terms used in Restitution Act as follows: 
(2) "Criminal Activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted. . . . 
* * * 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury« whether 
or not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out 
of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and 
includes the fair market value of the property taken, destroyed, broken or 
otherwise harmed, and losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, 
but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(l), (2), and (6). Section 77-38a-302(5)(a) provides in part: 
"[a] victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy or 
pattern. 
A. The Trust Deed. 
The trial court misinterpreted these provisions in making its restitution award. The 
trial court concluded that Johnson could be held jointly and severally liable with Schwenke 
for a $50,000 trust deed Schwenke gave on the dairy real property in October 2000 without 
Johnson's knowledge or involvement (R. 2075(2d):55-57; Restitution Exhibit 21) because: 
Johnson enabled Schwenke to obtain the trust deed, and Johnson's filing of 
the bankruptcy petition plainly indicates his knowledge of the trust deed and, 
at least to some degree, his continued knowledge of an involvement with the 
American Dairy.com scheme. 
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(Restitution Order, p. 7.) In holding Johnson joindy responsible with Schwenke for the trust 
deed, the trial court completely ignored that Sections 76-3-201(4) and 77-38a-302(l) both 
require the defendant be "convicted" of the criminal activity that is to form the basis for the 
restitution award. Notably, the $50,000 trust deed was the basis for the initial charge of 
"theft by deception" against Johnson and Schwenke, which the State voluntarily dismissed 
against Johnson. (R. 14; 63-64; 541-44.) The State presented no evidence at trial attempting 
to link the $50,000 trust deed either to Johnson or to the securities fraud charge. There was 
no "scheme," conspiracy or pattern of criminal conduct charged or proven. Schwenke's 
subsequent actions to obtain the trust deed are a separate criminal episode for which 
Johnson was neither charged nor convicted. The Restitution Act precludes the trial court 
from holding Johnson jointly responsible for a crime—theft by deception—for which he 
was not convicted. See State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402,1(18, 40 P.3d 1143 (vacating restitution 
because "defendant entered a guilty plea only to the receiving stolen property charge, she 
cannot be held to answer for all damages resulting from the burglary."). 
The trial court's conclusion as to the amount of loss from the trust deed is also 
erroneous. At the restitution hearing, the evidence showed that only $12,500 in cash came 
out of the $50,000 trust deed, and that this $12,500 all went to Young. (R. 2075(2d):10-13, 
55-57; Restitution Exhibit 17.) Young did not "recall" this until he saw the checks. (Id.) The 
remainder of the trust deed was nullified and stopped from being foreclosed upon. 
(R.2075:90-91, 96, 98; R. 2075(2d):73.) Accordingly, even if the trust deed could be Unked to 
Johnson, it was not a loss recoverable in restitution. 
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B. Myers' $70,000 CD 
The trial court's restitution award based on Myers' "lost" $70,000 CD is also 
erroneous. Myers obtained the CD in 1998. In 1999, Myers pledged the CD, along with all 
cows then owned or after acquired (valued at $137,000 at the time), to secure a $116,000 
loan from Central Bank. (R.2075:178-79; Restitution Ex. 9) The trial court's circular 
attempt to link Johnson to this loss is as follows: 
Prior to Schwenke's involvement with the dairy, Myers and Young used the 
line of credit secured by the CD to service the Central Bank loan and make 
payments on other debts. However, enabled by defendant, Schwenke brought 
an additional 200-250 head of cattle to the dairy, which Myers and Young 
were required to care for and feed. The Court finds that Myers and Young 
spent approximately $70,000 to feed and provide for the additional cattle— 
cattle from which, Myers and Young testify, they received de minimis or no 
monetary benefit. Once the additional cattle were repossessed, Myers and 
Young were unable to obtain Milk from them and therefore had no revenue 
with which to service the loan. As such Myers and Young defaulted, and 
Central Bank foreclosed on the CD and the other collateral securing its debt. 
The Court finds Myers would not have incurred this $70,000 loss but for 
Johnson's and Schwenke's acts. 
(Restitution Order, pp. 8-9) (footnote omitted). 
This hyper-attenuated causal link is not sufficient to satisfy Section 76-3-201(4) or the 
Restitution Act. It is difficult to understand how the lost CD is related to Johnson's 
conviction for violation of Section 61-1-1. It is undisputed that Myers did not transfer this 
CD to American Dairy in exchange for shares in American Dairy. There is no evidence that 
Johnson had anything to do with Schwenke bringing the cows to the dairy or that this was 
done without Myers' and Young' s consent. (R. 2075(2d):7, 23-24, 27.) Based on the trial 
court's rationale, Johnson would be liable for restitution to all victims of Schwenke's 
independent acts, no matter how far removed from the conduct for which Johnson was 
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convicted. This is improper as described by this Court in Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at ^[18. 
Myers' failure to pay the Central Bank loan when due, a loan that predated the July/August 
2000 transaction, is the proximate cause of the lost CD, not Johnson. 
The trial court also erred in disregarding evidence that Myers and Young actually 
suffered no net loss. Curiously, the trial court acknowledges Myers and Young used 
Schwenke's cows to "service" the preexisting loan from Central Bank, but then holds they 
suffered a loss when these cows, which they did not pay for, were repossessed. (Restitution 
Order, pp. 8-9.) Also contrary to the trial court's conclusion, Young's bankruptcy schedules 
(Restitution Exhibit 6) establish they never paid the feed bills for the cows but were forgiven 
in the bankruptcy discharge. See e.g.. Riddle v. Riddle, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273 (Cal App. 4 Dist. 
2005) (characterizing debt forgiveness as a net income gain rather than loss). Further, 
although the loan was periodically in default, (R. 2075:110; Restitution Exhibit 3), Myers sold 
the cows pledged to Central Bank, but did not pay off the Central Bank loan with the cow 
proceeds. (R.2075:112,184). As such, following default Central Bank took $58,476.46 from 
the CD to pay off the loan and gave Myers a check for the remaining $11,523.54, making the 
$70,000 restitution figure overstated by at least $11,523.54. (R. 2075:102-05.) Thus, Myers 
and Young suffered no loss from Johnson's conviction, making restitution inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Johnson's conviction should be reversed. In any event, 
Johnson's restitution award should be vacated. 
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UT ST §61-1-1 Pagel 
U.C.A. 1953 § 61-1-1 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 61. SECURITIES DIVISION — REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
CHAPTER 1. UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 
Copyright © 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
61-1-1 Fraud unlawful. 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of 
any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-1, enacted by L. 1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 4. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 61-1-1 
UT ST § 61-1-1 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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UT ST §61-1-13 Pagel 
U.C.A. 1953 § 61-1-13 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 61. SECURITIES DIVISION — REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
CHAPTER 1. UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 
Copyright © 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
61-1-13 Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means a person that, directly or indirectly, through one or 
more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by, or is under common control with 
a person specified. 
(2) "Agent" means any individual other than a broker-dealer who represents a 
broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of 
securities. "Agent" does not include an individual who represents: 
(a) an issuer, who receives no commission or other remuneration, directly or 
indirectly, for effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities 
in this state, and who: 
(i) effects transactions in securities exempted by Subsection 61-1- 14(1) (a), 
(b), (c), (i), or (j); 
(ii) effects transactions exempted by Subsection 61-1-14(2); 
(iii) effects transactions in a covered security as described in Sections 
18(b)(3) and 18(b)(4)(D) of the Securities Act of 1933; or 
(iv) effects transactions with existing employees, partners, officers, or 
directors of the issuer; or 
(b) a broker-dealer in effecting transactions in this state limited to those 
transactions described in Section 15(h)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
A partner, officer, or director of a broker-dealer or issuer, or a person occupying 
a similar status or performing similar functions, is an agent only if he otherwise 
comes within this definition. 
(3) "Broker-dealer" means any person engaged in the business of effecting 
transactions in securities for the account of others or for his own account. 
"Broker-dealer" does not include: 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(a) an agent; 
(b) an issuer; 
(c) a bank, savings institution, or trust company; 
(d) a person who has no place of business in this state if: 
(i) the person effects transactions in this state exclusively with or through: 
(A) the issuers of the securities involved in the transactions; 
(B) other broker-dealers; or 
(C) banks, savings institutions, trust companies, insurance companies, 
investment companies as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940, pension or 
profit-sharing trusts, or other financial institutions or institutional buyers, 
whether acting for themselves or as trustees; or 
(ii) during any period of 12 consecutive months the person does not direct 
more than 15 offers to sell or buy into this state in any manner to persons other 
than those specified in Subsection (3)(d)(i), whether or not the offeror or any 
of the offerees is then present in this state; 
(e) a general partner who organizes and effects transactions in securities of 
three or fewer limited partnerships, of which the person is the general partner, in 
any period of 12 consecutive months; 
(f) a person whose participation in transactions in securities is confined to 
those transactions made by or through a broker-dealer licensed in this state; 
(g) a person who is a real estate broker licensed in this state and who 
effects transactions in a bond or other evidence of indebtedness secured by a real 
or chattel mortgage or deed of trust, or by an agreement for the sale of real 
estate or chattels, if the entire mortgage, deed or trust, or agreement, together 
with all the bonds or other evidences of indebtedness secured thereby, is offered 
and sold as a unit; 
(h) a person effecting transactions in commodity contracts or commodity 
options; or 
(i) other persons as the division, by rule or order, may designate, consistent 
with the public interest and protection of investors, as not within the intent of 
this subsection. 
(4) "Buy" or "purchase" means every contract for purchase of, contract to buy, 
or acquisition of a security or interest in a security for value. 
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(5) "Commodity" means, except as otherwise specified by the division by rule: 
(a) any agricultural, grain, or livestock product or byproduct, except real 
property or any timber, agricultural, or livestock product grown or raised on real 
property and offered or sold by the owner or lessee of the real property; 
(b) any metal or mineral, including a precious metal, except a numismatic coin 
whose fair market value is at least 15% greater than the value of the metal it 
contains; 
(c) any gem or gemstone, whether characterized as precious, semi-precious, or 
otherwise; 
(d) any fuel, whether liquid, gaseous, or otherwise; 
(e) any foreign currency; and 
(f) all other goods, articles, products, or items of any kind, except any work 
of art offered or sold by art dealers, at public auction or offered or sold through 
a private sale by the owner of the work. 
(6) "Commodity contract" means any account, agreement, or contract for the 
purchase or sale, primarily for speculation or investment purposes and not for use 
or consumption by the offeree or purchaser, of one or more commodities, whether for 
immediate or subsequent delivery or whether delivery is intended by the parties, 
and whether characterized as a cash contract, deferred shipment or deferred 
delivery contract, forward contract, futures contract, installment or margin 
contract, leverage contract, or otherwise. 
(a) Any commodity contract offered or sold shall, in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary, be presumed to be offered or sold for speculation or investment 
purposes. 
(b) (i) A commodity contract shall not include any contract or agreement which 
requires, and under which the purchaser receives, within 28 calendar days from the 
payment in good funds any portion of the purchase price, physical delivery of the 
total amount of each commodity to be purchased under the contract or agreement. 
(ii) The purchaser is not considered to have received physical delivery of the 
total amount of each commodity to be purchased under the contract or agreement when 
the commodity or commodities are held as collateral for a loan or are subject to a 
lien of any person when the loan or lien arises in connection with the purchase of 
each commodity or commodities. 
(7) (a) "Commodity option" means any account, agreement, or contract giving a 
party to the option the right but not the obligation to purchase or sell one or 
more commodities or one or more commodity contracts, or both whether characterized 
as an option, privilege, indemnity, bid, offer, put, call, advance guaranty, 
decline guaranty, or otherwise. 
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(b) It does not include an option traded on a national securities exchange 
registered with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission or on a board 
of trade designated as a contract market by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission. 
(8) "Director" means the director of the Division of Securities charged with 
the administration and enforcement of this chapter. 
(9) "Division" means the Division of Securities established by Section 61-1-18. 
(10) "Executive director" means the executive director of the Department of 
Commerce. 
(11) "Federal covered adviser" means a person who is registered under Section 
203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or is excluded from the definition of 
"investment adviser" under Section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940. 
(12) "Federal covered security" means any security that is a covered security 
under Section 18(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 or rules or regulations 
promulgated thereunder. 
(13) "Fraud," "deceit," and "defraud" are not limited to their common-law 
meanings. 
(14) "Guaranteed" means guaranteed as to payment of principal or interest as to 
debt securities, or dividends as to equity securities. 
(15) (a) "Investment adviser" means any person who, for compensation, engages 
in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or 
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, 
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as a part of a 
regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities. 
(b) "Investment adviser" also includes financial planners and other persons 
who, as an integral component of other financially related services, provide the 
foregoing investment advisory services to others for compensation and as part of a 
business or who hold themselves out as providing the foregoing investment advisory 
services to others for compensation. 
(c) "Investment adviser" does not include: 
(i) an investment adviser representative; 
(ii) a bank, savings institution, or trust company; 
(iii) a lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher whose performance of these 
services is solely incidental to the practice of his profession; 
(iv) a broker-dealer or its agent whose performance of these services is 
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solely incidental to the conduct of its business as a broker-dealer and who 
receives no special compensation for them; 
(v) a publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news column, news letter, news 
magazine, or business or financial publication or service, of general, regular, and 
paid circulation, whether communicated in hard copy form, or by electronic means, 
or otherwise, that does not consist of the rendering of advice on the basis of the 
specific investment situation of each client; 
(vi) any person who is a federal covered adviser; or 
(vii) such other persons not within the intent of Subsection (15) as the 
division may by rule or order designate. 
(16) "Investment adviser representative" means any partner, officer, director 
of, or a person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, or 
other individual, except clerical or ministerial personnel, who: 
(a) (i) is employed by or associated with an investment adviser who is 
licensed or required to be licensed under this chapter; or 
(ii) has a place of business located in this state and is employed by or 
associated with a federal covered adviser; and 
(b) does any of the following: 
(i) makes any recommendations or otherwise renders advice regarding 
securities; 
(ii) manages accounts or portfolios of clients; 
(iii) determines which recommendation or advice regarding securities should be 
given; 
(iv) solicits, offers, or negotiates for the sale of or sells investment 
advisory services; or 
(v) supervises employees who perform any of the foregoing. 
(17) (a) "Issuer" means any person who issues or proposes to issue any security 
or has outstanding a security that it has issued. 
(b) With respect to a preorganization certificate or subscription, "issuer" 
means the promoter or the promoters of the person to be organized. 
(c) With respect to: 
(i) interests in trusts, including but not limited to collateral trust 
certificates, voting trust certificates, and certificates of deposit for 
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securities; or 
(ii) shares in an investment company without a board of directors, "issuer" 
means the person or persons performing the acts and assuming duties of a depositor 
or manager under the provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under 
which the security is issued. 
(d) With respect to an equipment trust certificate, a conditional sales 
contract, or similar securities serving the same purpose, "issuer" means the person 
by whom the equipment or property is to be used. 
(e) With respect to interests in partnerships, general or limited, "issuer" 
means the partnership itself and not the general partner or partners. 
(f) With respect to certificates of interest or participation in oil, gas, or 
mining titles or leases or in payment out of production under the titles or leases, 
"issuer" means the owner of the title or lease or right of production, whether 
whole or fractional, who creates fractional interests therein for the purpose of 
sale. 
(18) "Nonissuer" means not directly or indirectly for the benefit of the 
issuer. 
(19) "Person" means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, a limited 
liability company, an association, a joint-stock company, a joint venture, a trust 
where the interests of the beneficiaries are evidenced by a security, an 
unincorporated organization, a government, or a political subdivision of a 
government. 






(e) copper; and 
(f) such other substances as the division may specify by rule. 
(21) "Promoter" means any person who, acting alone or in concert with one or 
more persons, takes initiative in founding or organizing the business or enterprise 
of a person. 
(22) (a) "Sale" or "sell" includes every contract for sale of, contract to 
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sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for value. 
(b) "Offer" or "offer to sell" includes every attempt or offer to dispose of, 
or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security for value. 
(c) The following are examples of the definitions in Subsections (22)(a) and 
(b) : 
(i) any security given or delivered with or as a bonus on account of any 
purchase of a security or any other thing, is part of the subject of the purchase, 
and has been offered and sold for value; 
(ii) a purported gift of assessable stock is an offer or sale as is each 
assessment levied on the stock; 
(iii) an offer or sale of a security that is convertible into, or entitles its 
holder to acquire or subscribe to another security of the same or another issuer is 
an offer or sale of that security, and also an offer of the other security, whether 
the right to convert or acquire is exercisable immediately or in the future; 
(iv) any conversion or exchange of one security for another shall constitute 
an offer or sale of the security received in a conversion or exchange, and the 
offer to buy or the purchase of the security converted or exchanged; 
(v) securities distributed as a dividend wherein the person receiving the 
dividend surrenders the right, or the alternative right, to receive a cash or 
property dividend is an offer or sale; 
(vi) a dividend of a security of another issuer is an offer or sale; or 
(vii) the issuance of a security under a merger, consolidation, 
reorganization, recapitalization, reclassification, or acquisition of assets shall 
constitute the offer or sale of the security issued as well as the offer to buy or 
the purchase of any security surrendered in connection therewith, unless the sole 
purpose of the transaction is to change the issuer's domicile. 
(d) The terms defined in Subsections (22)(a) and (b) do not include: 
(i) a good faith gift; 
(ii) a transfer by death; 
(iii) a transfer by termination of a trust or of a beneficial interest in a 
trust; 
(iv) a security dividend not within Subsection (22)(c)(v) or (vi); 
(v) a securities split or reverse split; or 
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(vi) any act incident to a judicially approved reorganization in which a 
security is issued in exchange for one or more outstanding securities, claims, or 
property interests, or partly in such exchange and partly for cash. 
(23) "Securities Act of 1933," "Securities Exchange Act of 1934," "Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935," and "Investment Company Act of 1940" mean the 
federal statutes of those names as amended before or after the effective date of 
this chapter. 
(24) (a) "Security" means any: 
(i) note; 
(ii) stock; 
(iii) treasury stock; 
(iv) bond; 
(v) debenture; 
(vi) evidence of indebtedness; 
(vii) certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement; 
(viii) collateral-trust certificate; 
(ix) preorganization certificate or subscription; 
(x) transferable share; 
(xi) investment contract; 
(xii) burial certificate or burial contract; 
(xiii) voting-trust certificate; 
(xiv) certificate of deposit for a security; 
(xv) certificate of interest or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title 
or lease or in payments out of production under such a title or lease; 
(xvi) commodity contract or commodity option; 
(xvii) interest in a limited liability company; or 
(xviii) in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," 
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or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase any of the foregoing. 
(b) "Security" does not include any: 
(i) insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract under which an insurance 
company promises to pay money in a lump sum or periodically for life or some other 
specified period; or 
(ii) interest in a limited liability company in which the limited liability 
company is formed as part of an estate plan where all of the members are related by 
blood or marriage, there are five or fewer members, or the person claiming this 
exception can prove that all of the members are actively engaged in the management 
of the limited liability company. Evidence that members vote or have the right to 
vote, or the right to information concerning the business and affairs of the 
limited liability company, or the right to participate in management, shall not 
establish, without more, that all members are actively engaged in the management of 
the limited liability company. 
(25) "State" means any state, territory, or possession of the United States, 
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 
(26) "Working days" means 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, exclusive of 
legal holidays listed in Section 63-13-2. 
(27) A term not defined in Section 61-1-13 shall have the meaning as 
established by division rule. The meaning of a term neither defined in this section 
nor by rule of the division shall be the meaning commonly accepted in the business 
community. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-13, enacted by L. 1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 16; 
1989, ch. 225, § 84; 1990, ch. 133, § 7; 1991, ch. 161, § 9; 1992, ch. 216, § 1; 
1993, ch. 158, § 2; 1997, ch. 160, § 5. 
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CHAPTER 1. UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 
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Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
61-1-21 Penalties for violations. 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates any 
provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16, or who willfully 
violates any rule or order under this chapter, or who willfully violates Section 
61-1-16 knowing the statement made to be false or misleading in any material 
respect. 
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1: 
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was committed, 
the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was 
worth $10,000 or less; 
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if, at the time the crime was 
committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be 
obtained was worth more than $10,000. 
(3) No person may be imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he 
proves that he had no knowledge of the rule or order. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-21, enacted by L. 1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1971, ch. 155, § 1; 
1983, ch. 284, § 30; 1990, ch. 133, § 14; 1991, ch. 161, § 12; 1992, ch. 216, § 4; 
1997, ch. 160, § 10. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 61-1-21 
UT ST § 61-1-21 
END OF DOCUMENT 
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Westlaw 
U T ST §76-3-201 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-3-201 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS 
PART 2. SENTENCING 
-•§ 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed— 
Civil penalties—Hearing 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which 
a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the 
money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and 
losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to 
a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person 
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of 
them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
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(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall 
order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which 
the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the 
criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall 
order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if 
the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the 
state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to 
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appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection 
(5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each 
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually 
transported in a single trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, 
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal 
activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition 
to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for 
costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(6) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise 
ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay 
restitution to the county for the cost of incarceration in the county correctional 
facility before and after sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in 
incarceration in the county correctional facility; and 
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional 
facility through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided under 
Section 64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined 
in Section 64-13e-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13e-
102. 
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the daily inmate 
incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs for the county 
correctional facility. 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses 
incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable 
accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as 
defined and covered by the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 
U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical and mental health treatment for 
the inmate's disability. 
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(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this 
Subsection (6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, 
the court shall consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302 (5) (c) (i) 
through (iv) and shall enter the reason for its order on the record. 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under 
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the 
county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs 
of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 38A. CRIME VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
-f§ 77-38a-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the 
condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make 
restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a 
prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet 
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts 
or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair 
market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses 
including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary 
damages and pain and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and 
defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon 
which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution 
and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant 
but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing 
sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth 
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in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon 
which, following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in 
abeyance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and 
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any 
agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or 
where charges are dismissed without a plea. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to 
a victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for 
expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may be 
further defined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction 
of an offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, 
except that the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an 
accomplice, or a bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the 
public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate 
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that 
has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 38A. CRIME VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT 
PART 3. RESTITUTION REQUIREMENTS 
-•§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall 
order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this 
chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as 
part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning 
as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(14) and in determining whether restitution is 
appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in 
Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and 
court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for 
all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the 
time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under 
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court 
record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall 
include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or 
to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that 
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, 
includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the 
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, 
the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
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(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss 
or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices 
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and 
treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law 
of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost 
due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned 
by the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time 
of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted 
in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and 
(b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or 
on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution 
and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(d) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (5) (d) (ii), the court shall determine 
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution 
orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after 
sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one 
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer 
an order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of 
restitution. 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS 
-•RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, 
OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008 
Copr © 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works. 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY 
•+RULE 702. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis 
for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods 
underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) 
are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to 
the facts of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the 
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the sufficiency 
of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are 
generally accepted by the relevant expert community. 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008 
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
STATE COURT RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY 
-•RULE 704. OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or 
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a 
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the 
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element 
of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for 
the trier of fact alone. 
Current with amendments effective April 1, 2008 
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
-•Sec. 7. [Due process of law] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session. 
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UT CONST Art. 5, §1 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 5, §1 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE V. DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
-•Sec. 1. [Three departments of government] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session. 
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U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 6, § 1 
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 
-*Sec. 1. [Power vested in Senate, House, and People] 
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in: 
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the 
Legislature of the State of Utah; and 
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2)(a)(i) The legal voters of the State of Utah, in the numbers, under the 
conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may: 
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people 
for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as 
provided by statute; or 
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a 
two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be 
submitted to the voters of the State, as provided by statute, before the law 
may take effect. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated to allow, 
limit, or prohibit the taking of wildlife or the season for or method of taking 
wildlife shall be adopted upon approval of two-thirds of those voting. 
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under the 
conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may: 
(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people 
of the county, city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting 
on the legislation, as provided by statute; or 
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the county, 
city, or town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute, 
before the law or ordinance may take effect. 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session. 
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MARK L. SHURTLEFF - #4 666 
Utah Attorney General 
5272 South College Drive, #200 
Murray, UT 84123 
Telephone: (801) 281-1221 
Facsimile: (801) 281-1224 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : and ORDER 
vs. : 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, : Case No. 051700056FS 
Defendant. : Judge Donald Eyre 
Defendant Jamis Johnson's Motion to Quash Bindover Order and 
Dismiss Information, came on regularly for hearing on the 22nd 
day of June 2006, before the Honorable Samuel D. McVey. The 
State was represented by its counsel of record E. Neal Gunnarson, 
Assistant Attorney General. The defendant was present and 
represented by his counsel of record Joe Cartwright. 
The State moved to dismiss Count II of the Amended 
Information (Theft by Deception) as against defendant Johnson. 
The motion was granted by the Court. 
210S J - J A** u* 
i:roEY.—. 
Based upon the pleadings on file, including the preliminary 
hearing transcript, the evidence adduced, and argument of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court 
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Utah's securities fraud statute, U.C.A. § 61-1-1, is 
applicable in this case; 
2. The State has satisfied the statutory requirements that 
there be an offer and a sale of a security, stock; 
3. The defendant's status as a disbarred attorney at the 
time of the alleged offer or sale of a security is 
material; 
4. Defendant's statements and omissions of his status as a 
disbarred attorney at the time of the alleged offer or 
sale of a security were misleading; 
5. Defendant's status as a disbarred attorney at the time 
of the alleged offer or sale of a security might have 
affected the alleged victim's right to exercise their 
option to repurchase their farm; 
6. A reasonable investor might want to know with whom the 
2 
investor was working to effect an option; non-
disclosure of defendant's disbarment might be material 
enough to violation Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1; 
7. The following facts could be material: 
a) Defendant could have been in trouble with the Utah 
State Bar and the Utah Supreme Court at the time 
of the alleged offer or sale of a security; 
b) Defendant had large civil judgments against him at 
the time of the alleged offer or sale of a 
security; 
8. The jury could find that the above facts, paragraphs 
7(a) and 7(b), would affect a reasonable person's 
desire to enter into a stock transaction. 
9. The alleged victims Mr. Young and Mr. Myers lost 
control of the assets of their LLC in exchange for a 
security, stock. 
10. The doctrine of "change in the form of ownership" as 
argued by the defendant is not applicable in this case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The doctrine of "change in the form of ownership" as argued 
by defendant is not applicable in this case^ 
3 
The State has presented sufficient evidence of defendant's 
possible guilt of securities fraud, as alleged in the 
information, Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1, to bind the defendant over 
for trial. 
Because the Court granted the State's motion to dismiss 
Count II of the Information, Theft by Deception, a second degree 
felony, defendant's motion to dismiss as to Count II is moot, and 
should be denied. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby orders as 
follows: 
Pursuant to the State's motion, Count II of the Information, 
Theft by Deception, a second degree felony, is dismissed as to 
defendant Johnson. 
Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover Order and Dismiss 
Information with respect to the remaining Count I, Securities 
Fraud, a second degree felony, is denied. 
DATED t h i s _ J £ day of MiJovS^ , 2006 . 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICES 
I hereby certify that on this 4 day of (7U<*MSCK . 
2006, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Plaintiff's proposed "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order" to be served by the method(s) indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Joe Cartwright, Esq. 
Cartwright Law Firm 
363 Shelley Lane 
Grantsville, UT 84029 
^ United States Mail, postage prepaid 
Overnight Express Mail 





J AMIS M. JOHNSON 
Defendant fro Se 
352 South Denver Street, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 530-0100 
Telefax: (801) 530-0900 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, MILLARD COURT 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTA 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMS M. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Ca^e No. 051700056 FS 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on regularly for hearing on February 7,2007, before 
the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Fourth District Court Judge Donald J. Eyre presiding. The 
State was represented by Assistant Attorney General Mark Baer and Defendant was present and 
appeared pro se. The Court after having considered the pleadings on file and having heard the 
arguments of counsel and the parties, for good cause appearing, now enters the following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1) The nature and amount of prosecutorial misconduct alleged by Defendant to have 
occurred in this matter is not of a level warranting dismissal; 
2) Any alleged poisoning of the witnesses James Young and Ronald Myers by former 
prosecutor E. Neal Gunnarson goes to issues of their credibility if they testify which may be the 
basis for impeachment of any new testimony; 
3) Because the Court previously determined there was sufficient credible evidence for 
-1-
«JtL$u^*U«&. 
this matter to be bound over for trial and that at trial the State will be required to carry a different 
burden of proof which is beyond a reasonable doubt, the issues of law raised by Defendant can be 
dealt with in proposed jury instructions rather than a pre-trial Motion to Dismiss; and 
4) Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
DATED this day of February, 2007. 
COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I deposited, postage prepaid, atrQe^nd correct copy 
of the foregoing proposed Order in the U.S. M^ft^f MaiJ^BS^^ssistant Attorney Senegal, 5272 




























this time, Your Honor. The state, the state rests. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Mr. Johnson, are you prepared 
to call your first witness? 
MR. JOHNSON: I would need about a, my first 
witness is Mr. Schwenke. He, I understand he's been 
transported, oh, indeed. I do have, I have a motion to 
dismiss perhaps you should hear— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: — if you're ready for that or— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: And I believe that, is that in front 
of you without the jury or— 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Members of the jury, there's a, I 
guess additional matters that we'll need to take up outside 
of your presence so if you'll return to the juryroom. 
Okay. The record may reflect the jury has left the 
courtroom. You indicated, Mr. Johnson, that you had a 
motion that you desired to make? 
MR. JOHNSON: Right, Your Honor. I understand 
that the state has rested and a, I would to make my, make a 
motion to dismiss. The a charging statute 61-1-1 subsection 
(2), which we have covered thoroughly a, has not been 




























proven and a, so as a matter of law the case must be 
dismissed. 
Let me first refer to a, the facts that have been 
adduced, well, to the statute if I may. If I may, 
Your Honor, that's the statute over there, let me get a 
little closer, it's big enough for me to see. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, the a, state has to 
establish that a, first of all there was an offer, sale or 
purchase of a security. And a, we demonstrated and a, an 
expert witness of the state stated that a, an offer, sale or 
purchase of a security must be for value and that there is no 
value given. 
We demonstrated that a, the, whether Mr. Young 
understood it or didn't understand it, or misperceived it or 
at a later time a, worked with Mr. Schwenke demonstrated that 
a, the a, the stock, or well the transfer, that they were the 
only, Mr. Young and Mr. Myers were the only shareholders of 
the a, of Americandairy.com and no other shareholders have 
been a, evidenced or demonstrated. Also the contract that's 
a state's exhibit demonstrates and states specifically there 
are no other shareholders. 
Further the a, testimony was that a, this was a 
transfer a, as it was transferred from the LLC that they a, 





























And a, the court observed in passing that a, didn't 
they lose or give up control when they transferred because 
the court observed that there's a reference to getting one 
board of director. And I would point out to the court, and 
it's a matter of corporate law, that the a, the, the 
shareholders, all of whom consisted of Mr. Myers and 
Mr. Hines (sic?) have ultimate control, whether there were 
20 directors or no directors, a, the shareholders can sit 
down, write a one line decision and a, change whatever they 
want. 
We also heard testimony that they a, got an option 
to move the farm around wherever they wanted, they had a, the 
right to operate the farm. We also heard testimony that 
nothing changed. We heard testimony that when a, they 
transferred whatever equipment they transferred it stayed 
right there, they kept milking. They didn't change their 
invoices, they didn't open up new accounts, they didn't, they 
didn't change the way they did business and they had full 
control of the business. 
THE JUDGE: That is not the case though. That 
was not the testimony. Wasn't it the testimony of Mr. Young 
that they, let's see, one example that they desired to lease 
the facility and Mr. Schwenke told them that they couldn't 




























THE JUDGE: Well but all that's, all that is to be 
presented is not before the court. 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, the exhibit is before the 
court. 
THE JUDGE: It is. 
MR. JOHNSON: I mean— 
THE JUDGE: But whether, but whether there was a 
functioning board of directors is not, or whether they were 
the only stockholders is not. Because Mr. Young also 
testified that Mr. Schwenke told him there were other 
stockholders. 
MR. JOHNSON: Indeed, Your Honor. But two 
things, three things. 
One, and I, I want to address this, the agreement 
that is presented by the state says that they have, they are 
entitled to like a board of, a board of directors or a 
(inaudible word, away from) board of directors. And they, 
if we understand that they are the only shareholders— 
THE JUDGE: Well I don't know that, that— 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, okay. But I mean in other 
words, that argument is irrelevant. If there are 20, as I 
say if there were 20 directors or zero directors if they are 
the only shareholders then a, if they are the only 
shareholders that, that directorship is irrelevant. The 




























Now as to whether they are the only shareholders or 
not it's the state's obligation to present evidence a, that 
there are. 
Now here's the thing. They presented the two 
stock certificates of these a, gentlemen. They've had two 
years to find out if they're the shareholders. They a, and 
then we presented a, a contract, best evidence, that says 
there are no other shareholders— 
THE JUDGE: I don't know, I don't know if that 
contract says that or not. 
MR. JOHNSON: Well assuming if it does say that, 
if that's what it does say a, I mean it's up there, it's in 
evidence, then they are the only shareholders. 
THE JUDGE: Well, the contract also says there's 
authorized 10,000,000 shares— 
MR. JOHNSON: Indeed but— 
THE JUDGE: —when we only, when we only have 
200,000. 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, and Your Honor knows that if 
there's 10,000,000 shares and they are the only shareholders 
those are what's called I guess treasury stock, or I mean, 
you know, they, there's not, it's, the contract says, 
authorized 10,000,000 shares, but there isn't, there are no 
other shareholders. 




























MR. JOHNSON: Now, I guess if you want to say 
that I— 
THE JUDGE: — what it gets down to is I think 
that your argument with respect to whether this was for 
value is a question for the trier of fact. You can make all 
those arguments to the trier of fact. If they don't find it 
was for value and you can make those same arguments then, 
then a— 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. Well— 
THE JUDGE: — the state, the state has not met 
its burden. I think at least the status of the, of the 
evidence before me is that the issue of whether, whether 
there was value is an issue, issue for the trier of fact. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. I'm just saying as a 
matter of law if, if they are the only shareholders and there 
are no other shareholders that there is not an exchange of 
value. And despite what Mr. Young says, I just thought 
Mr. Schwenke was going to help me or not help me or have a 
lease or whatever, I couldn't do this or that, that is not 
what the evidence is. And I, and I'm entitled to rely on 
whatever document I'm alleged to have signed. 
So we argue one, that it's not, there's no exchange 
of value. Two, I would argue that there's no offer, sale or 
purchase a, and a, and they, they a, they got the stock, 




























actually ended up with all of the, all of the stock. They 
weren't offered to sell it or purchase it, nor was anyone 
else that I know of. So on that basis it should be 
dismissed. 
The next inquiry though is a, whether there was a 
predicate statement and, and if that statement was false. 
Now, oh, and the a, the... We tried to adduce a couple of 
predicate statements. There was the predicate statement I am 
a Utah attorney. And apparently the court is as, indicates 
that being a president of a corporation a, is essentially a, 
makes the statement that I am worth a, you know, that someone 
has a, it's a predicate statement that to be an attorney, I 
mean, to be a president. If I understand the court's a, 
statement earlier, that would be a predicate statement we 
look at. Beyond that I have not been able to adduce any 
other a, material statement made a, you know, beyond that. 
But let's, let's analyze those two. 
I think we have established that I am a Utah 
attorney, I didn't represent them and a, didn't a, make a, 
didn't offer to represent them. There was a statement that 
he felt comfort a, about that and a, I don't know what he 
felt. 
There was a statement Mr. Myers made that I told 
him I was some securities expert. But again if you look at 
the document that was signed they get all the stock. If he's 
COURT' PROCEEDINGS 
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assuming I'm going to help him a, take out some sort of IPO 
public that's something in the future and that's really not, 
it's beyond the August 8th transaction. But the August 8th 
transaction is the transaction we're bound by. And I'm 
looking for this predicate statement. 
THE JUDGE: Well wasn't, but though wasn't the 
induce, wasn't there some inducement by the, the statement 
that this was going to be, there was going to be a public 
offering? 
MR. JOHNSON: Well I mean, you mean a statement to 
enter into the August 8th transaction? 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. JOHNSON: Is that what you're saying? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. Because Mr. Myers's testimony 
was the only reason I entered into this is because I needed 
financing and a, and a — 
MR. JOHNSON: Well first of all, an inducement is 
not part of the statute. But if there is an inducement 
then we have to look and see if that, if that inducement is 
reasonable, if it was material and a, and I guess we're 
looking at that. But, but then, and the question would be if 
there's, if there's damage. And the court said well, I'm 
not interested in damage. Nothing I did had anything to do 
with whatever damage they experienced. 




























MR. JOHNSON: There's been no evidence that, 
that— 
THE JUDGE: It's all, it has to be associated with 
the sale or offer to sell a security. 
MR. JOHNSON: Well— 
THE JUDGE: And a — 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. So I guess I'm saying you 
have to have a statement made. And so the question, if I 
understand this you're saying that well, the statement you 
made was you're an attorney that we're talking about and, and 
had experience. And so then the question is, the only 
question the statute says was that rendered misleading by 
something. I guess we've allowed those, we've allowed a, 
evidence in. 
I would argue that a, as to attorneyness, attorney 
status does not render it misleading. Secondly, as to some 
sort of expertise, my expertise wasn't a, at issue here in 
this. There was no offering, there was no public 
registration, there was no IPO. And we're bound by the 
August 8th transaction. 
If, and I guess the other question is a, I guess 
Your Honor is saying did I hold myself out as an attorney to 
induce them, or are you saying that they just felt good about 
that a, I mean, I don't see that in the statute. 
I was arguing, Your Honor, my motion to dismiss 
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that the two predicate statements that I think we're looking 
at, if I understand this, is a Utah attorney and a, 
secondly, president at this point. I don't know that I'm 
going to introduce in my case any more predicate 
statements. 
If the court is saying that there's another one a, 
we will have an IPO in the future, then I'm willing to, to 
look at that and address that. But a, I don't believe 
there's been evidence a, that indicates that's untrue or it 
was an untrue hope, or that, you know, and everyone seemed to 
know that it would involve thousands of cows apparently and 
millions of dollars. 
So, you know, the state, the question is not 
whether or not that statement is an inducement I guess, 
clearly not under the statute, the question is whether— 
THE JUDGE: Well, it was clearly a statement made 
in association with the offer to sell or purchase of a 
security, wasn't it? 
MR. JOHNSON: You're talking about the IPO? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, I guess, I think I guess it 
would have to be, and there, there's absolutely no value. If 
you're saying look I've the got a, a pizza store and I'm 
hoping to go public in a couple of years a, that statement 




























of a security, because where is the value? How can there be 
value a, for a future IPO if you're talking about that 
security? 
The a, I mean, if we want to identify the statement 
that there's going to be a coming IPO, a, and then I guess 
that will be a predicate statement I'll address. But a, 
first attorney status was not rendered misleading a, by any 
of the information because on that date I was an attorney, I 
mean, I was an attorney, and I didn't offer,. And it is 
also, it's not material because I wasn't offering to be an 
attorney for anybody. 
On the a, secondly, the concept that a, the second 
predicate statement is a, president of, I signed as president 
of a, an entity. It's clear that that was, perhaps my 
evidence will (short inaudible, away from mic). But again 
the question would be is being a president a, rendered 
misleading by any of the omissions. 
And we have, we have several omissions, we've got 
attorney, we've got the a, disciplinary action, we've got 
tax liens, we've got, I think the other one was a judgment, 
those would be the omissions. And I would say that being, 
serving an a nominal president for this company a, to a, to 
give them stock does not mean that a, is not rendered 





























I guess the question would be well, you represented 
to us that a, you could, you could be a president, you could 
have to be a president, or you would be I guess you'd say an 
honest president or something like that, or, you know, you'll 
be, and you know, and so a, I, I don't see, I don't know if 
that's a representation. If that's what the court wants to 
find it as. I don't know that a president per se of a 
company if there's a judgment or tax lien they can't get a, 
the company. If someone is being made a president to run 
an auto mechanics store and he has a tax lien they may, if 
he's going to be paid a salary he'd maybe have to pay that 
tax lien salary. Does it mean he can't run the auto 
mechanics store. 
And a, here there's no, there's no argument that a, 
a tax lien, there's no evidence adduced, but there's no 
argument that a tax lien would render president status 
misleading, there's no argument that, my personal tax lien. 
There's no argument that my personal a, judgment would 
render president status misleading. And there's no argument 
that my a, Bar discipline would, would render an ability or 
lack of ability to be president misleading. And none of 
those private things, in fact a, the finances of anybody, of 
anything, of any company. 
So I would argue, Your Honor, that the predicate 




























misleading by the three omissions. There was only three 
omissions that they have, three categories of omissions. 
The other predicate statement I have is again 
attorney status. Same thing, I still function as an attorney 
so I have my expertise. 
That said, I would finally say that it is clear, 
there's no evidence been adduced that there are any other 
shareholders. And it's, it's a little bit disingenuous to 
suggest that there are. They've had years to find this 
out. And a, there are a, specific stock that they did have, 
the corporation, it has probably been around for a while,, 
they've had access to Mr. Schwenke. 
Secondly, if the court says that the agreement, 
the agreement speaks for itself, if the agreement does say 
that those are the only shareholders of all of the 
outstanding issued stock, if the stock is owned by the 
corporation and, and they owned the stock of the corporation, 
they owned all the stock of the corporation. Let's talk 
logical. And if they are all of the shareholders they 
control it, whether it was multiple guys or not multiple 
guys. 
So I think, Your Honor, based on... And so, and 
the state has come here saying my goodness we a, we, you 
know, originally they said Mr. Johnson a, or the guy, or the 




























Mr. Young say that. And that's simply not true. And we've 
said that now, we've pointed this out for a year. There is 
no evidence a, that's what they want to say. 
But how was the farm given to in Schwenke? And 
maybe they went together and said let's go get cows. But 
there is no evidence adduced that the statement that 
Mr. Young made that he said I didn't fully understand this 
at the start I guess, to his attorney, came back and said I 
guess I didn't understand how it worked, I couldn't get 
Mr. Schwenke to, to work with us. And that's the only 
evidence they have that they have adduced. 
I think I'm entitled to, to stand by the 
agreement. It is, it is a change in the form of 
ownership. Clearly they thought the where his .com or 
cameras, we're going to figure something out. But they 
didn't give Mr. Schwenke greater control, there's no 
evidence that Mr. Schwenke had stock or a lease or any 
relationship. They took him and they he took them, he and 
Jim— 
THE JUDGE: They also gave Mr. Schwenke their 
voting rights in the proxy. 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, I saw the proxy. Again, that 
went to Mr. Schwenke and there's no evidence that that went 
to me. 




























from mic). But okay. That's my, my position, Your Honor. I 
think as a matter of law the state has not met its burden to 
prove that this (short inaudible, away from mic) ownership 
transaction is truly a, an offer, sale or purchase of a 
security. And the predicate statements they've adduced as I 
understand them, lawyer and president, are not rendered 
misleading by the three omissions. 
Finally I might add they, they have made some 
statements that a, oh, you've got to, you've got to, did 
Mr. Johnson give you historical data pn the company. If 
indeed it's a change in the form of ownership, and there was 
nothing in it before, a, there would be nothing to give 
them. And, and afterwards it's their, it's their financial 
information as far as I know. I don't see how a, that's 
even germane. And there's no statute that's been adduced 
that requires that. And that's not an omission as far as I 
know, it doesn't render my president status misleading. 
The a, and there's one final aspect to that. The 
state has alleged that a, I overheard or I was present when 
various discussions went under way. And a, those cannot 
necessarily be attributed to me one way or the other without 
evidence that a, clear evidence when I was there and what I 
heard and what, what I agreed to. 
Anyway, Your Honor, this is not a, as a matter of 
law the case is not proven, the state has not proven its 
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case. Admit that a, there was a corporation, they went 
nowhere with these guys, they submitted the stock. It ends 
there. And this is not a, a transaction that should even go 
beyond this. There's no, we haven1t adduced anything about 
loss but it's clear, it's clear that I had nothing to do with 
their loss or a... 
Okay. I rest. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. Mr. Baer? 
MR. BAER: I'll be brief, Your Honor. I'll make a 
comment. Do you want me at the bench here or— 
THE JUDGE: Right there is fine. Turn the 
microphone around. 
MR. BAER: Just a, a few points starting probably, 
well, starting where I start. 
The defendant's reasoning about the future events, 
I mean, it's interesting because of his objections to 
bringing in what happened at the end. But even from a 
theoretical standpoint it would render all securities 
prosecutions moot. It would. Because any security 
anticipates future events. I mean, that's why you take a 
stock, it might go up, might go down, something might 
happen. So the idea that somehow future events which aren't 
even covered by the a, the charging information in August 
would somehow be dispositive as to, as to the situation 
before the court right now. It's just plain wrong on its 
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face. That's the first. 
The second I would point out is a test of what a 
reasonably prudent investor would need to know in order to 
make an informed decision or to, to proceed with what he 
did. I mean, that's what all of this evidence goes to, is it 
goes to the materiality of it and substance of it. And 
that's something that a trier of fact does, and that trier of 
fact of course is the jury, and that's why it should go to 
the jury. 
When it comes to statements or representations 
we've had a plethora of, of that about stock, specialist, 
attorney. And when you take the idea of an attorney in 
light of the circumstances on which they are made or the, 
or the omission part of the elements, we've now stipulated to 
the a, disciplinary action, that's certainly something the 
trier of fact should have an opportunity. That doesn't even 
begin to address the issue of the IPO and its tradeability 
and so forth. 
And still further there's all of these other 
issues about things that were omitted as to financing and 
background and history. And he was present when Mr. Schwenke 
statements went in, and he obviously made his own 
statements. 
And all of that a, goes to a clearly denial of the 
motion for a directed verdict at this point. 



















THE JUDGE: Are you making any, holding 
Mr. Johnson to any statements made by Mr. Schwenke? Are 
you, are you relying solely upon the statements or 
omissions— 
MR. BAER: No. It's the total mix, the light of 
the circumstances of the situation. It's like a totality of 
the circumstances test, it's all of it. But that of course, 
I mean, the jury can decide. 
As far as the transfer of ownership this document 
speaks for itself. There are 10,000,000 shares issued, a, 
there are only 200,000 going to these two victims. That's 
number one. 
But secondly I would point out understate statute 
61-1-13(g), and I'll read that into the record, 
The issuance of a security under a 
merger, consolidation, reorganization, 
recapitalization, reclassification or 
1 8 II acquisition of assets shall constitute 
19 the offer or sale of the security issued 
20 as well as the offer to buy or the 
21 purchase of any securities surrendered in 
22 connection therewith unless the sole 
23 purpose of the transaction is to change 
24 the issuer's domicile. 




























THE JUDGE: What's, what's the reference? 
MR. BAER: 61-1-13 subsection (g). 
I mean even if the facts were there, which the fact 
are not, that a, would a, hopefully direct the court in the 
right direction. 
Finally, at this stage in the proceedings all 
inference are in favor of the state, it's a preponderance 
standard a, that the state has more than met its burden in 
that regard. 
And a, we ask that the motion be denied. 
MR. JOHNSON: He said something about future 
events and (short inaudible, away from mic) is simply not 
true. And that's why a, if you have an IPO you go, you refer 
to the a, statute that requires what you have to adduce for 
an IPO. And a, if the court is saying that a, I mean, if 
what the court is saying that somehow a, I merely spoke of a 
future IPO to induce a transaction then we must look at the 
transaction, we must look at have alleged to adduce. 
And it is, it is fair for me to say what, what 
happened in my mind was what was on that contract that I 
signed there. They kept all of the stock and ran the 
corporation, they went and sought their own attorney, they 
changed the document. And, you know, I signed over stock to 
them. 
The a, and so and I guess a, indeed a, without more 
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is this I guess the sort of, if I'm involved to this extent 
and af my case will go further I guess. But without more I 
must say that I'm entitled to rely... If I fooled them into 
it's a future hope of something that didn't happen, you know, 
assuming I said that, although there's evidence I did not, 
and assuming my presence led them to think that, and we're 
going to talk about that, they were led then into something 
right while they still had control, and that was the 
testimony. No (short inaudible, away from mic) stock changed 
hands. They just called Mr. Schwenke and said can we lease 
that and he said no. 
Now and I, unless I misunderstand that what we're 
going forward on is I, I think identified two predicate 
statements, law, president. And the further predicate 
statement deal with IPO. I don't think that was attributed 
to me a, and a, I'm glad to, to urge the court that... 
Well you heard Mr. Young state I didn't ever make a 
representation about, you know, IPO or about a, stocks or 
about a, getting money, or there are no representations that 
I made. And in fact, he didn't know that I had any of the 
plans that Mr. Schwenke had. 
So, I mean, is that a, am I hearing today that a, 
I'm now also what's going to go to the jury is statements 
attributed by me about having an IPO? You know, I would to 
argue that that's, I should, that should be dismissed. I 
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haven't heard the state adduce evidence— 
THE JUDGE: Well I can, you know, it!s up to the 
jury to make a determination as to the statements you made. 
But a, my recollection is is that that's what Mr. Myers 
testified that you made. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. Then is that being deemed a 
predicate statement is what, what— 
THE JUDGE: Well, it's not up to me to make 
to make those determinations, it's up to the trier of fact 
MR. JOHNSON: So the trier of fact will have to 
ascertain what predicate statements were made. Okay. 
THE JUDGE: They, they have to make a 
determination as to what statements were made and then 
whether there were omissions of a material fact necessary for 
them to make, to make those statements in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made not misleading. 
MR. BAER: And Judge, just so there's no 
misunderstanding what they have to determine is the evidence 
that we have submitted, if it's applicable to the charge and 
the information. That's plan and simple, plain as day. 
MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor then, Your Honor 
indicated that it was irrelevant to determine a, if there 
will any damage as a— 
THE JUDGE: I think that's the case law that says 




























MR. JOHNSON: I ask a, I should ask both of these 
gentlemen, I guess they will testify as to what they told me 
and I think it's, it's germane because a, it turns out that 
I'm not the (short inaudible, away from mic) these 
difficulties. 
THE JUDGE: You know, those type of issues would 
go to the issues of restitution. From what I know right 
now I don't know if there's any restitution owed because, 
because your argument is correct I think is that, that they 
came into to this with a mortgage, that that mortgage was not 
paid and they lost it because of the mortgage that was 
preexisting. 
MR. JOHNSON: And I didn't have nothing to do with 
their interaction with Mr. Schwenke. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. JOHNSON: Now so I guess then, I mean, if that 
seems to me to be a, it's not a... Okay. So then we have 
to determine then if, if the statute meets the a, the law and 
in order to dismiss at this point. 
THE JUDGE: No. The court, I think there is 
sufficient evidence for this matter to go to the trier of 
fact, a jury, with respect to whether, whether these 
omissions of material facts would meet the minimum 





IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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JAMIS M. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
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Judge Donald J. Eyre 
Defendant filed a timely Motion for New Trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The Court, having carefully considered and reviewed the file in this matter, the 
memoranda submitted by the parties, and arguments of counsel, makes the following Ruling and 
Order. 
I. 
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. Criminal Information was filed against Defendant on December 19,2005, charging 
him with one count of Securities Fraud and one count of Theft by Deception. 
2. A preliminary hearing occurred on October 24, 2005, where defendant was 
represented by Peter Stirba. Court's Minute Entry, Oct. 24, 2005. 
3. On November 23, 2005, Mr. Stirba filed a Motion for Permission to Withdraw as 
Counsel for Defendant. On November 28,2005, defendant appeared pro se and filed 
a motion, inter alia, to continue the date of the scheduled arraignment hearing. 
4. Defendant was arraigned on December 19, 2005. 
5. On January 6,2006, attorney Joe Cartwright filed aNotice of Appearance as counsel 
for defendant. 
6. On January 25,2006, defendant filed Motions to Quash Bindover Order and Dismiss 
Information. The Court denied the motion on June 21,2006. Also on June 21,2006, 
the Court granted State's motion to dismiss the Theft by Deception charge. See 
Court's Minute Entry, June 21, 2006. 
7. On September 25, 2006 a Motion Hearing was held to review the Defendant's 
conditions of release as well as Defendant's Motion to Disqualify Gunnarson as 
counsel. 
8. On October 25, 2006, attorney Donald J. Purser filed an Entry of Appearance, 
indicating his appearance was "limited . . . as co-counsel to Joe Cartwright as 
attorneys for Defendant with respect to Defendant Johnson's Motion to Disqualify 




9. On November 17, 2006, defendant's attorney, Joe Cartwright, filed a Motion to 
Withdraw as Counsel. 
10. On December 13, 2006, defendant filed a Reply to Plaintiffs Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Disqualify E. Neal Gunnarson. 
11. In January of 2007, Defendant Johnson began representing himself pro se. See 
Court's Minute Entry, January 17,2007 (Court inquired as to defendant's criminal 
trial practice experience); Defendant Johnson's Reply to State's Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; and Response to State's Motion to Dismiss 
Defendant's Motion, filed January 22, 2007 (indicating defendant representing 
himself pro se). 
12. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss based on prosecutorial misconduct and 
insufficient evidence on January 3,2007. Following oral argument on February 7, 
2007, the Court denied defendant's Motion to Dismiss and to disqualify the entire 
office of the Attorney General. On that date, the Court further ordered that Mr. 
Gunnarson was not to consult with Mr. Baer, the new counsel representing the 
State, regarding this matter. The Court also ordered Mr. Baer to "create a wall of 
separation to prosecute this case independently" of Mr. Gunnarson. Court's Minute 
Entry, February 7, 2007. 
13. A three-day jury trial commenced on March 5, 2007. At the conclusion of the trial 
on March 7, the jury convicted defendant of Securities Fraud, a Second Degree 
Felony. 
14. On June 1,2007, attorneys Rodney G. Snow and Walter A. Romney filed a Notice 
of Appearance indicating their representation of defendant. 
15. On June 4, 2007, defendant filed a Rule 23 Motion for Arrest of Judgment, which 
the Court subsequently denied. 
16. Defendant was sentenced on June 6, 2007. 
17. On June 20, 2007, defendant filed a Motion for a New Trial. The State filed a 
response in opposition to the Motion on July 9,2007. On July 19, 2007, defendant 
filed a reply memorandum and a Request to Submit for Decision pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 12. 
II. 
RELEVANT LAW AND LEGAL STANDARD 
Defendant was convicted of one count of securities fraud, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 61-
Fraud unlawful[.] 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any 
security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading; or 
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(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 provides criminal penalties for violations of §61-1-1, providing, 
in relevant part, the following: 
(2) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1: 
* * * 
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if: 
(i) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully 
obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $ 10,000 or more[.] 
Defendant moves for a new trial pursuant to Utah R.Crim.P. 24, which states, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The motion 
shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in support of the 
motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or evidence the court may 
postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems reasonable. 
* * * 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no trial had 
been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence 
or in argument. 
The Supreme Court of Utah summarized the purpose of Rule 24 thus: "Rule 24 permits a trial 
court to 'grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a 
substantial impact upon the rights of a party.' Thus, the rule is an overall expression of the need to 
rectify any error in the trial process that significantly impacted a defendant's rights." State v. 
Maestas, 2002 UT 123, P54 (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a)); see also State v. Kooyman, 112 P.3d 
1252, 1265 (Utah App. 2005) ("A motion for new trial generally is permitted for correcting errors 
made in the trial court, or for reviewing a conviction obtained by unfair or unlawful methods."). 
Thus, a trial court may broadly review the trial proceedings to determine whether there was 
any "error or impropriety which had a substantial impact upon" Johnson's rights. The scope of 
evidence reviewable by the trial court on a motion for a new trial is thus broader than the scope of 
evidence it reviews on a motion for arrest of judgment. The standard followed by a trial court in a 
motion for arrest of judgment is, of course, "the same standard appellate courts apply in determining 
whether a jury verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence. Under that standard, 'a trial court 
may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element.'" State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, P20 (citing 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993)). 
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"When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial, [an appeals court] will not 
reverse 'absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.'" State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, P 12 
(quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Utah 1998)). 
In Tibbs v. Florida, the Supreme Court of the United States also quoted the Eighth Circuit's 
description of the process through which a trial court may weigh the evidence when considering a 
motion for a new trial: 
When a motion for new trial is made on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the 
weight of the evidence, the issues are far different.... The district court need not 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict; it may weigh the 
evidence and in so doing evaluate for itself the credibility of the witnesses. If the 
court concludes that, despite the abstract sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
verdict, the evidence preponderates sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a 
serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred, it may set aside the verdict, grant 
a new trial, and submit the issues for determination by another jury. 
457 U.S. 31, 38 n.ll (quoting United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1316-19 (8th Cir. 1980)) 
(quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is appropriate to grant a motion for a new trial if "the evidence 
preponderates sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have 
occurred[.]" 
III. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
After carefully considering the arguments presented by both the State and Mr. Johnson, the 
Court rules that the motion for a new trial should be denied. The Court will address each of the 
Petitioner's arguments in turn. 
A. Hines' Expert Testimony 
Defendant argues that the Court erred in permitting certain testimony from the State's expert 
witness Michael Hines. Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
for New Trial at 5-19 [hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial]. At trial, Mr. Hines 
identified himself as Director of Enforcement for the Utah Division of Securities. Tr. Trans, p. 
39:2-3. The Court will summarize and respond to each of defendant's meritorious arguments. 
1. Legal conclusions 
Defendant argues, first, that Hines was permitted to include purely legal conclusions in his 
testimony. Defendant argues that these legal conclusions included statements 
that the securities fraud statute requires affirmative disclosure of all material facts; 
that the CEO of a corporation is a control person of a corporation who has a duty of 
disclosure of all material facts; that material facts include issues of background, 
credentials, credit-worthiness, etc.; and that certain disclosures are required to be 
included in registration statements. 
Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 7. 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 702 permits expert testimony where "specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issuef.]" Utah R. Evid. 
702. "[EJxpert testimony may be appropriate in securities fraud cases because the technical nature 
of securities is not within the knowledge of the average layman or a subject within the common 
experience and would help the jury understand the issues before them." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 
1355,1361 (Utah 1993) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In addition, "[t]he trial court has 
wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony[.]" Id. (citations omitted). 
Utah Rule of Evidence 704 permits testimony on an ultimate issue of the trial: "[Testimony 
in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces 
an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704(a). However, "opinions that 
'tell the jury what result to reach' or 'give legal conclusions' continue to be impermissible under 
rule 704." State v. Davis, 155 P.3d 909, 914 (Utah App. 2007) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). There are several reasons for these exceptions to Rule 704: testimony couched as a legal 
conclusion is not helpful to the finder of fact; such testimony tends to blur the roles of the judge, 
witness, and the jury; and such testimony creates a risk that the jury will turn to the witness, rather 
than the judge, for guidance on the applicable law. Id. at 914-15 (citations omitted). 
"No 'bright line' separates permissible ultimate issue testimony under Rule 704 and 
impermissible 'overbroad legal responses' a witness may give during questioning." Davis, 155 P.3d 
at 915. However, relevant case law indicates that the various categories of testimony are 
impermissible. See Davis, 155 P.3d at 915 (collecting cases). It is, for example, impermissible to 
allow testimony where a witness "state[s] his views of the law which governs the verdict and 
opinefs] whether defendants' conduct violated that law[,]" Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 806 
(10th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (quoted inDavis, 155 P.3d at 915). In State v. Stringham, counsel for the 
State presented a hypothetical factual scenario to a witness from the Internal Revenue Service that 
precisely described the alleged actions of the defendant in the case, and then asked the witness 
whether that conduct was lawful. The witness testified that such actions were not lawful. 957 P.2d 
602, 607 & n.15. (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that "a legal 
conclusion like that offered by the IRS agent is not within the province of an expert witness." Id. 
at 607. The court further concluded the IRS agent's testimony overgeneralized and incorrectly 
interpreted the law, because "[t]he only relevance of the IRS expert's testimony would have been 
to establish that assigning income to GS Consulting was illegal for the purposes of defendant's 
pension. However, the expert only testified as to what would be illegal for federal income tax 
purposes, which was not at issue." Id. at 606. The court concluded that the testimony of the IRS 
agent may have been correct concerning tax matters, but "could easily have misled the jury" when 
offered in the case at hand, which concerned ^pension matter. Thus, the court seemed to conclude 
that the IRS agent's testimony was improper because (1) it gave a plainly a legal conclusion 
regarding the actions of which the defendant was accused, and (2) the legal conclusion was 
overbroad and misleading. 
State v. Tenney is also instructive and particularly relevant to the facts here. In Tenney, two 
expert witnesses testified that the defendant's actions violated the Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
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The State's first expert witness, Steve Nielsen, testified that failure to disclose 
certain enumerated information would be a material omission under Utah law, that 
the Cellwest Business Plan did not meet disclosure requirements under the Act, and 
that defendant's predictions about the future of the stock and Cellwest's financial 
statements did not comply with Utah law. The State's second expert witness, Cathy 
Krendl, testified that certain information was material under the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act, that failure to disclose this information would be a material omission 
or misstatement under the Act, and that the material actually provided to investors 
did not meet disclosure requirements under the Act. In addition, Krendl testified that 
the buy-back agreements were securities under Utah law. 
913 P.2d 750,756 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (emphases in original). The Utah Court of Appeals held that 
the experts' testimony impermissibly gave legal conclusions, and stated that "those portions of the 
expert witnesses' testimony to which defendant objects quite clearly state legal conclusions because 
the witnesses tie their opinions to the requirements of Utah law." Id. 
It is important to distinguish Tenney from State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). In 
Larsen, also a criminal securities case, the securities expert for the State provided testimony 
occasionally using the word "material" and testified "as to the 'materiality' of information [the 
defendant] alleged had omitted from securities-related documents." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1360-61. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the expert's testimonial use of "material" constituted an 
"'inadmissible legal conclusion' because the statute in question is framed in terms of material 
information.'" Id. at 1361 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2)). The Court noted that the expert 
"should have avoided employing the specific term cmaterial[,]'" but concluded that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony for three reasons. First, the court emphasized 
that the expert seemed to use the term in its non-legal sense and that the popular meaning of the term 
closely related to a question of fact before the jury. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1362.1 Thus, the court 
resolved that the testimony was not so clearly a legal conclusion that the trial court abused its 
discretion in admitting it. Second, the court concluded, the issue of materiality was an "ultimate 
issue" under Rule 704, and Rule 704 expressly notes that otherwise admissible testimony that 
"embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact" is not objectionable solely on those 
grounds, as the defendant seemed to suggest. Id.2 Third, even if the trial court's admission of the 
testimony was erroneous, the defendant had not shown that such error was harmful: 
The term "material" as used by the expert could have two meanings—one in ordinary parlance and the 
other as a legal term of art—but the meanings are "almost identical[.]" Id. The jury was charged with determining 
whether the defendant's statements or omissions were "factually material, i.e., whether they were likely to influence 
a reasonable investor." Id. (citing TSCIndus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,450 (1976)). (The court quoted 
TSC Industries Inc. v. Northway, Inc. thus: "Issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed question of law 
and fact."Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1362 (quoting TSC, 426 U.S. at 450).) Thus, the court concluded, the word 
"materiality" "had a popular meaning bearing directly on the factual issue before the jury" and, "when read in 
context," the expert's use of the word seemed to reflect the meaning of the word in ordinary parlance, "as a synonym 
for 'important.'" Id. 
2
 See also id. ("rule 704 does not make expert testimony admissible simply because it expresses an opinion 
regarding an ultimate issue. By the same token, however, rule 704 does not make expert testimony inadmissible 
simply because it expresses an opinion on the ultimate issue.. ..") (citations omitted). 
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The trial court correctly admonished the jury as to the relative roles of expert 
testimony and opinion evidence and instructed the jury to accord no unusual 
deference to an expert's opinions. The trial court also gave careful instructions 
regarding the legal definition and requirements of the term "material" as used in the 
statute. Taken together, these instructions substantially reduced whatever slight risk 
of confusion Cook's use of the term "material" might have engendered in the jury. 
Given the trial court's adequate instructions to the jury, we find that if any error had 
occurred in admitting the expert testimony, it would have been harmless. 
Id. at 1363; see also Davis, 155 P.3d at 916 (summarizing the court's rationale in Larseri). 
Like the expert testimony at issue in Larsen, the expert testimony provided in defendant's 
trial was also harmless, and defendant has not shown that the testimony had a "substantial adverse 
effect upon [his] rights[.j" Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). The Court further suspects that, on appeal, 
defendant will likewise be unable to establish that "'that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
verdict would have been different' had the . . . [C]ourt disallowed this testimony." Davis, 155 P.3d 
at 915 (quoting Stejfensen v. Smith's Mgmt Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993)). Hines' 
testimony was harmless for three reasons: first, defendant thoroughly cross-examined Hines during 
the two times Hines testified at trial, see Tr. Trans, at 68-93,101,108,488-494; and also provided 
his own expert witness. See Tr. Trans, at 372-487. The effect of defendant's cross-examination and 
provision of his own expert witness was, of course, to allow defendant the opportunity to influence 
the jury's understanding of securities and the facts at hand in a manner favorable to defendant's 
case, and to clarify, expose, or undermine inaccuracies in Hines' testimony. Second, Hines' 
testimony was harmless because the Court properly instructed the jury on the applicable law. See 
Jury Instruction 1 ("You are to be governed in your deliberations solely by the evidence introduced 
in this trial and the law as stated to you by me") (emphasis added); Jury Instruction 3 (setting forth 
the elements of securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1); Jury Instruction 15 (same); Jury 
Instruction 17 (defining "sell" or "sale;" "offer" or "offer to sell;" "material fact;" "security;""buy" 
or "purchase;" and "fraud"). The Court noted specifically in Jury Instruction 8 that the jury should 
"consider . . . expert opinion and . . . weigh the reasons, if any given for it," but also noting that the 
jury was "not bound.. . by such an opinion." Additionally, Jury Instruction 8 provided that "[i]f an 
expert witness has expressed an opinion of the law which is in conflict with these instructions, you 
are to disregard the opinion of the expert witness." During Hines' first appearance on the witness 
stand, the Court stated to the jury that he would later instruct them on the relevant law. Tr. Trans, 
at 61:17-22. As in Larsen, "these instructions substantially reduced whatever... risk of confusion" 
caused by the expert testimony. 865 P.2d at 1363. 
2. Hines' allegedly incorrect and confusing interpretations of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 and 
materiality 
Second, defendant argues that Hines was permitted to provide testimony that (a) incorrectly 
interpreted § 61-1-1, which likely confused the jury, and (b) incorrectly interpreted the law 




a. Confusing/misleading interpretation of§ 61-1-1. Defendant alleges that Hines' testimony 
was misleading in that it led the jury to believe § 61 -1 -1 requires persons who offer or sell securities 
to affirmatively disclose "everything a reasonable investor would want to know[.]" Id. at 8. 
Defendant correctly notes that under §61-1-1, "[t]here is no affirmative duty to disclose anything[,]" 
id., but rather, a seller or offeror of securities must disclose only information "necessary in order to 
make . . . [prior] statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2) (2005). Defendant argues that "[t]he case went to trial 
under the constant and repeated insistence of the State prosecutor and [Hines] that Young and Myers 
[(the alleged victims)] were entitled to 'know everything a reasonable investor would want to know' 
and that Defendant Johnson had an affirmative duty to disclose things 'a reasonable investor would 
want to know.'" Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 14.3 Defendant further notes that the 
Court refused to provide a jury instruction prepared by defendant relating to §61-1-1. Defendant's 
Memorandum for New Trial at 15. 
3
 Defendant reproduces the following portions of the trial transcript in support of his argument that Hines' 
testimony was misleading and confusing: 
A. [Mr. Hines] But in the area of securities caveat emptor does not apply, it is a seller 
beware market. In other words, the purchaser of a security has to totally rely on the truth and the 
total truth from whoever is selling it to them, and so it[']s protected under a theory of it's called 
seller beware. In other words, the seller has to make sure that they disclose all material facts to the 
person that's purchasing that, that certificate. 
MR. JOHNSON: Objection that actually is a misstatement of the law (short inaudible, no 
mic). 
THE JUDGE: Well he's . . . I've qualified him as an expert. That's his opinion. You can 
cross-examine him on that. 
MR. JOHNSON: Can we get some foundation about what sort of context he's speaking 
of (short inaudible, no mic) basis of foundation. 
THE JUDGE: Overruled. You can cross-examine him. 
Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 9 (quoting Trial Transcript p. 51:21 to 52:12). 
A. [Mr. Hines] The important facts that would have to be disclosed in all circumstances 
are numerous. But the general test is it an important fact that a purchaser of normal prudence 
would want to know before they make their decision. And these cover certainly financial 
statements of the entity which would include audited balance sheets, that would include the history 
of any of the control people whether they had been civilly sued, whether they've had 
administrative actions, bankruptcies and things like that. Competition in the market, conflict of 
interest. Necessary disclosure would include risk factors and there's . . . It's a very broad range. 
And if you turned it around and ask yourself what are what, what is a fact that a normal investor 
would want to know before they decide, those facts have to be disclosed. 
Q. (MR. BAER:) What would those kind, for example, what kind of things would those 
factors, risk factors as you've testified? 
A. Well, certainly risk factors would include-
MR. JOHNSON: Objection. Relevance. Again Your Honor, 61-1-1 does not require that 
you disclose all of these things, it just says if you make a disclosure it has to be accurate. And 
we're not talking about a full disclosure statute. Its foundation and I -
MR. BAER: It also speaks to admissions, omissions. 
THE JUDGE: Overruled. 
Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 10 (quoting Trial Transcript p. 55:20 to 56:21). 
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b. Confusing/misleading interpretation of materiality. Defendant argues that the State 
mischaracterized the law of materiality by stating that the only test of materiality is "anything a 
reasonable investor would want to know . . . regardless of whether it was in connection with [the] 
transaction in issue or 'relevant' in even the ordinary meaning thereof to this change of form of 
ownership transaction." Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 16. Defendant's theory of 
materiality as applied to his case is as follows: 
As a starting place of analysis, both Mr. Young and Mr. Myers had testified that they 
would have proceeded with this transaction regardless of whether Johnson was even 
present. That being the case neither any statement nor omission made or not made 
by him can be deemed relevant to this transaction. If Johnson's presence in itself was 
not material, nothing connected to that can be material. Johnson's attorney status and 
prior experience had nothing to do with the stock itself in issue or the change in form 
of ownership transaction, particularly where no party was relying on Johnson to be 
their attorney and Young and Myers had their own, independent counsel and have 
testified that Johnson's license status was not relevant to them engaging in this 
transaction. 
Id. at 17. Defendant further notes that the Court refused to provide a jury instruction prepared by 
defendant relating to materiality. Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 16. Defendant then 
sets forth case law concerning the relevant definition of materiality or "material fact": "something 
which a buyer or seller of ordinary intelligence and prudence would think to be of some importance 
in determining whether to buy or sell[,]" id. at 17 (quoting S & F Supply Co. v. Hunter, 527 P.2d 
217,221 (Utah 1974)); a fact that would be viewed by a "reasonable investor as having significantly 
altered the 'total mix' of information available," id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
231-32(1988)). 
Defendant also cites case law to support his argument that an additional "critical test of 
materiality" is "that the untrue statements [must be] related to the security," id. (quoting Pitman v. 
Lightfoot, 937 S.W.2d496,531 (Tex.App.1996); citing Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 
989 F.2d 1408,1418 (5th Cir. 1993)). However, both of the cases cited by defendant construe Tex. 
Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 581-33A.(2) (Supp. 1993), which contains language substantially different 
from Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1. The Texas provision appears more narrow in its command: "A 
person who offers or sells a security. . . by means of din untrue statement of a material fact or an 
omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading. . . ." (emphasis added). Cf Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-1 (using the following broader language: "It is unlawful for any person, in connection 
with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to . . . (2) make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading[.]" 
(emphasis added). Thus, to the extent that defendant's definition of materiality stems from a statute 
(Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 581-33A.(2) (Supp. 1993)) more narrowly drafted than the controlling 
statute here (Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1), it is erroneous. Defendant's definition of materiality 
included in his proposed jury instruction also appears to deviate from Utah law, as it required, as an 
element in the definition of "material" fact, that the fact "is a financial detail regarding the stock 
itselff.]" Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 16 (reproducing proposed jury instruction). 
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Defendant's arguments as to Hines' testimony regarding § 61-1-1 and materiality fail for the 
same reasons that his arguments concerning Hines' legal conclusions fail. Defendant cross examined 
Hines and provided his own expert witness. The Court properly instructed the jury as to the 
applicable law (including the elements of §61-1-1 and the meaning of "material fact"), the role of 
the judge, and the limits of expert witness testimony. Therefore, defendant has not shown that Hines' 
testimony had a "substantial adverse effect upon [his] rights" at trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). 
B. Insufficient Evidence to Support Defendant's Conviction of a Second-Degree Felony under 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (2)(b) 
Defendant next argues he should be granted a new trial because the evidence presented could 
not support a conviction of a second-degree felony for securities fraud. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
21(2)(b) provides that a person is guilty of a second-degree felony where he violates § 61-1-1 and 
where, "at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or 
sought to be obtained was worth $ 10,000 or more[.]" Defendant argues that he "did not obtain, or 
seek to obtain, anything of value, and certainly not anything worth over $10,000." Defendant's 
Memorandum for New Trial at 20. 
In support of this argument, defendant makes three contentions: first, he argues that in the 
transaction at issue in the trial (which occurred on August 9, 2000), the property owned by the 
alleged victims Young and Myers was merely moved from an LLC to a corporation, and Young and 
Myers retained a 100% ownership interest in the resulting corporation. Thus, defendant reasons, he 
did not obtain anything of value from the August 9, 2000 transaction. 
Second, defendant points to two of Schwenke's acts that, defendant concedes, caused harm 
to Young and Myers: (a) Schwenke encouraged Young and Myers to increase the dairy's number 
of cows and assured them he would financially support the additional cows, but failed to provide 
that support, causing the victims greater loss; and (b) Schwenke borrowed $50,000 against the land 
and equipment comprising the dairy. Defendant claims that "Schwanke [sic] alone benefitted from 
the proceeds and failed to make the payments on the note." Defendant further argues: 
[T]he evidence clearly established that Johnson had absolutely nothing to do with 
either of these transactions. . . . The Court cannot enter judgment that would 
increase the crime of which Johnson stands convicted from a third to a second degree 
felony on the basis of evidence the Court correctly ruled was not admissible against 
Johnson because he was not shown to have even been aware of it and because it 
occurred long after his involvement with the victims had ceased. 
Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 20-21. 
Third, defendant argues that"worth" in § 61 -1 -21 (2)(b) must mean "market value," computed 
as "the sum of any indebtedness against the property . . . subtracted from its actual value." 
Defendant argues that, at trial, "[t]here was no evidence regarding the actual value of the acreage 
or buildings or fixtures which comprised the dairy, but there was evidence of unspecified trust deed 
indebtedness against those assets."Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 22. Defendant 
concedes that Young and Myers testified as to the estimated dollar value of the farm equipment, but 
notes that they admitted the farm equipment was heavily encumbered. Defendant further alleges that 
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Young and Myers failed to disclose at trial other encumbrances on the property, including a trust 
deed on the land and buildings and a "mortgage against all existing and after-acquired equipment." 
Id. In short, defendant argues that after taking the sum of debt on the property and the market value 
of the property, "the equipment could have no 'equity' or 'value5 necessary to form the grounds for 
a conviction." Id. Defendant also argues the Court committed error when it did not allow 
defendant's proposed jury instruction concerning value. 
It is instructive here to examine the text of the statute at issue, § 61-1-21 (2)(b) which, again, 
provides that a person is guilty of a second-degree felony where he violates § 61-1-1 and where, "at 
the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to 
be obtained was worth $ 10,000 or more[.]" As defendant correctly observes, this provision cannot 
be satisfied unless some "property, money, or thing... worth $10,000 or more" was either obtained 
by defendant or sought by defendant. In short, if among other requirements the state had failed to 
prove the existence of something "worth" $10,000 or more, § 61-l-21(2)(b) could not be satisfied. 
Defendant's argument that the state did not prove the existence of anything worth $10,000 
relies entirely on a definition of "worth" where "worth" is computed as the sum of the market value 
less indebtedness. Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 22 ("Needless to say, to establish 
'market value' the sum of any indebtedness against the property must be subtracted from its actual 
value."). Therefore, defendant argues, because only incomplete evidence about the indebtedness of 
the acreage, buildings, fixtures, and equipment related to the dairy was presented, the evidence could 
not have established the value ("worth") of the property for purposes of § 61 -1 -21 (2)(b). Defendant 
concedes, however, that "Young and Myers testified about the estimated dollar value of the farm 
equipmentf.]" Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 22. 
The text of § 61-l-21(2)(b) does not require that the "worth" of the "property, money, or 
thing" at issue be computed as the net sum of actual value and indebtedness. Defendant also cites 
no authority for that proposition. Defendant relies on State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (1977), for its 
definition of market value as "what the owner could expect to receive, and the amount a willing 
buyer would pay to the true owner for the stolen item." Id. at 813 (citations omitted); see also State 
v. Greene, 2006 UT App 445 PI 1 ("In the absence of statutes providing otherwise, we measure the 
value of property taken in theft cases by looking at such property's 'fair market value at the time and 
place where the alleged crime was committed') (citing Logan, 563 P.2d at 813 (Utah 1977)). This 
definition, of course, does not require the subtraction of related debts, liens, or other encumbrances 
on the property. Applying arguendo the definition of market value in Logan to § 61 -1 -21 (2)(b), the 
State must only show "the amount a willing buyer would pay to the true owner" of the "property, 
money, or thing" at issue "at the time the crime was committed" was equal to or exceeded $10,000. 
Evidence of the original purchase price of the property in question is not sufficient, "especially . . 
. where certain goods stolen were purchased substantially prior to the theft and the aggregate price 
paid for the goods is not significantly greater than the . . . [$10,000] threshold amount 
distinguishing" a second-degree felony from a third degree felony under § 61-1-21. See State v. 
Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 284 (Utah Ct.App. 1998). Additionally, courts "have been very strict in 
requiring affirmative proof of value, especially when the value alleged is close to the line dividing 
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one offense from another[.]" Zellers v. United States, 682 A.2d 1118,1120 (D.C. 1996) (quoted in 
Lyman, 966 P.2d at 283). 
During defendant's trial, the State provided testimony that the estimated value of the farm 
equipment transferred in the August 9, 2000 transaction facilitated by defendant far exceeded 
$10,000. See Tr. Trans, at 148-51,234-37 (testimonies of Young and Myers, estimating equipment 
values that sum to more than $150,000).4 Thus, based on the evidence presented by the State, the 
jury could have easily concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that, by facilitating the transaction at 
issue, defendant "sought to . . . obtain[]" property, money, or something else "worth $10,000 or 
more" "in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any securityf.]" Utah Code Ann. §§61-1-
21; 61-1-1. In other words, the jury could have inferred that, when he facilitated the formation of 
the corporation including Young's and Myers' assets and signed as its president, defendant at that 
moment "sought t o . . . obtain[]" proceeds worth more than $ 10,000 secured by the equipment. After 
all, as defendant notes, Schwenke separately did just that. Defendant's Memorandum for New trial 
at 20 ("The evidence . . . established that Schwenke also borrowed $50,000 from a hard-money 
lender and issued a trust deed covering the land and all the equipment comprising the dairy to secure 
the indebtedness."). 
In sum, § 61-1-21 requires the State to prove that, "at the time" § 61-1-1 was violated, 
defendant "obtained or sought to . . . obtain[]" something worth $10,000 or more. Reflecting this 
language, the relevant Jury Instruction required a finding that, "[a]t the time, the property, money, 
or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $ 10,000.00 or more." Defendant's 
Memorandum for New Trial at 5 (reproducing Jury Instruction, 15). The jury considered all 
evidence presented at trial and, pursuant to the jury instruction, found that defendant had indeed 
"obtained or sought t o . . . obtain[]" something worth $ 10,000 or more. As such, defendant has made 
no showing that, at trial, "any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon [his] 
rights" occurred with respect to the valuation requirements of § 61-l-21(2)(b). Utah R. Crim. P. 
24(a). 
C Court's Denial of Johnson's Motion for Continuance of Trial 
Defendant next argues he should be granted a new trial because he inadequately 
represented himself after he chose to appear pro se. Defendant began representing himself in 
middle to late January of 2007. See, e.g., Defendant Johnson's Reply to State's Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; and Response to State's Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Motion, 
filed January 22, 2007 (noting that defendant was representing himself). Defendant chose to 
represent himself after the Court had been assured that defendant's self-representation was 
It is not perfectly clear how Young arrived at these equipment values. Counsel for the state apparently 
asked Young to provide the replacement value of the equipment. Tr. Tran. at 150:2-13 (counsel for the State asking 
whether Young's involvement in the dairy business "would entail [Young] knowing the value of these things that 
you'd have to replace"); see also id. 150:17 (counsel for the State asking Young "at that point what was . . . the 
value, the estimated value, the general value" of the equipment). Young's testimony refers to "replacement value" 
and also to purchase price. Tr. Tran. at 151:2, 12. Regardless of the precise method of measurement used, however, 
the equipment transferred in the transaction significantly clears the $10,000 threshold of § 61-l-21(2)(b). Counsel 
for the State similarly asked Myers to estimate rough replacement value. Tr. Tran. at 236. 
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voluntary and knowing under the sixteen-point colloquy found in State v. Frarnpton. 737 P.2d 
183, 187 n. 12 (Utah 1987). Defendant correctly cites the further applicable rule in Frarnpton: 
that "[a] defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of 
his own defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel." Id at 189 (citations 
and quotations omitted). 
Despite this rule from Frarnpton and defendant's knowing and voluntary decision to 
represent himself, he nonetheless argues his case is exceptional for several reasons. First, he 
claims, his previous counsel withdrew "because he was cowered by the aggressive bullying 
tactics of former prosecutor Gunnarson"—see related discussion in Part D below—and 
defendant felt "overwhelmed" and "over his head" as he prepared to represent himself. 
Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 25. As a result, defendant claims, he made, in 
addition to "a host of other failures[,]" the following errors: (1) he failed to discover evidence, 
not presented at trial, of the value of the farm and equipment at issue; (2) he inadequately cross-
examined Young and Myers "due to fear of arousing their wrath by confronting them with their 
prior inconsistent statements[.]" Id. at 25-26. 
Defendant's arguments on this point do not persuade the Court that defendant's 
representation of himself had a "substantial adverse effect upon [his] rights" at trial for two 
reasons. Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). First, the preliminary hearing occurred on October 24, 2005, 
where the State presented evidence indicative of what it ultimately presented at trial more than a 
year later. Hence, defendant Johnson was aware, well in advance of trial, of the type of evidence 
and arguments to expect from the State. Second, defendant's choice to represent himself despite 
the associated risks was knowing and voluntary, as determined by the Court after reviewing with 
defendant the sixteen-point colloquy set forth in Frarnpton. See also State v. Pedockie, 137 P.3d 
716, 724 (Utah 2006) ("Frarnpton establishes a sound framework for efficient and complete 
questioning. Moreover, on appeal, such a colloquy provides the reviewing court with 'an 
objective basis for review upon the almost inevitable challenge to the waiver by the defendant 
who proceeds pro se and is subsequently convicted.'") (quoting Wayne R. LaFave et al., 3 
Criminal Procedure § 11.5(c) (2d ed. 1999) (other internal quotations omitted)). 
D. Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial based upon alleged misconduct of Neal 
Gunnarson, the attorney formerly prosecuting the case on the State's behalf. Johnson here 
alleges, as he has previously, that Gunnarson and others inappropriately coached and prompted 
Myers and Young "about Johnson's character and acts so as to adversely and inappropriately 
impact their testimony." Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 27. Johnson further alleges 
that Gunnarson disregarded the Court's order not to consult with Assistant Attorney General 
Mark Baer as to the case and to prosecute it independently. Id Thus, Johnson argues, "at a 
minimum there is clearly an appearance of impropriety that justifies granting [defendant] a new 
trial." Id The court has previously considered defendant's allegations of misconduct and, in 
response, ordered Baer to prosecute the case independently of Gunnarson. However, the Court is 
not persuaded that prosecutorial misconduct has occurred here such that the trial as conducted 
had a "substantial adverse effect upon [his] rights" at trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). A trial court's 
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discretionary determination as to prosecutorial conduct, or lack thereof, will not be reversed 
absent a showing that the error was substantial and prejudicial to the defendant and that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that a more favorable ruling would have resulted absent the misconduct. 
State v. Gubler, 2007 UT App 188, 3. 
E. Cumulative Errors 
Defendant Johnson next argues that a[t]he cumulative effect of the errors discussed 
above, if not in respect to their individual level, justifies granting a new trial." As set forth 
above, the Court concludes that the individual arguments set forth by defendant have not shown 
"any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." Utah 
R. Crim. P. 24(a). For the reasons stated in response to defendant's discrete arguments set forth 
above, the Court further concludes that the combined effect of defendant's arguments and 
allegations also do not demonstrate a substantial adverse effect upon his rights. 
F. Discovery of New Evidence 
Johnson claims to have discovered new evidence since the time of trial including the 
following: (1) a former USDA milk inspector who "has direct information concerning the 
viability of the dairy operation relating to its operation and various health and safety violations in 
the 1990's, which directly impacted the dairy's viability and value prior to its limited 
involvement with Johnsonf;]" (2) a trustee's deed that "discloses a competitive bid auction at the 
foreclosure by Central Bank which established a fair market value for the dairy of $161,000.00, 
while the dairy had debts exceeding $324,000.00 at the time of foreclosure—within months of 
the dairy's limited involvement with Johnson[;]" and (3) a federal tax lien "for approximately 
$13,000 was recorded against the dairy within months of Johnson's limited involvement with 
Mr. Young and Mr. Myers." Defendant's Memorandum for New Trial at 29-30. 
"In order to constitute grounds for a new trial the evidence must (1) be such as could not 
with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial; (2) not be merely 
cumulative; and (3) be such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the case." 
State v. Kooyman, 112 P.3d 1252, 1266 (Utah 2005) (citing State v. Martin, 44 P.3d 805, 810 
(Utah 2002)) (internal citations omitted). 
Defendant's claims to have discovered new evidence also falls short of the standards 
required by Kooyman and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24. First, as noted above, defendant 
and his various attorneys had been aware of the charges and the type of evidence the State would 
present since, at the latest, October 24, 2005—more than a year before trial. Thus, defendant 
cannot plausibly argue that the new evidence he claims to have discovered through post-
conviction investigation "could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and 
produced at the trial." Kooyman, 112 P.3d at 1266. Second, all of the evidence defendant 
purports to have discovered go to the value of the farm and/or equipment at issue. However, as 
discussed above, ample evidence of the value of the equipment was presented at trial such that 
the jury could conclude that, under Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-21(2)(b), defendant "sought to . . . 
obtain[]" property, money, or something else "worth $10,000 or more" "in connection with the 
offer, sale, or purchase of any security[.]" Utah Code Ann. §§61-1-21; 61-1-1. Thus, the 
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evidence defendant claims to have discovered fails under the third ground stated in Kooyman 
because it would not "render a different result probable on the retrial of the case." Kooyman, 112 
P.3d at 1266. Finally, defendant's purported discovery of new evidence is procedurally deficient. 
Rule 24 requires that a motion for a new trial "be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the 
essential facts in support of the motion." Utah R. Crim. P. 24(b). Aside from defendant's 
representations in his memoranda, he present no evidence or affidavits relating to the evidence 
he purports to have discovered. 
G. Statements of Paul Schwenke Subsequent to Trial 
Johnson lastly argues that a letter written to the Court by Paul Schwenke subsequent to 
trial constitutes another basis upon which a new trial should be granted. Defendant's 
Memorandum for New Trial at 30. In short, defendant appears to argue that Schwenke's letter is 
new evidence constituted grounds for a new trial. As such, the three-part standard in Kooyman 
again applies. 112 P.3d at 1266. 
At trial, defendant called Schwenke as a witness and had the opportunity to question him 
directly about Schwenke's involvement, and his own involvement, in the transaction. See Tr. 
Tran. at 294-330; 345-46. The information brought forward in Schwenke's letter to the Court 
was nothing that could not have been brought forth at trial. In addition, Schwenke's letter likely 
would not lead to a different result if the Defendant were tried again. Thus, the standards in 
Kooyman provide no basis upon which Schwenke's letter is grounds for a new trial. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that defendant has not shown the 
occurrence at trial of "any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon [his] 




WHEREFORE, defendant's Motion for a New Trial is DENIED. 
Signed this / ( ) day of October, 2007. 
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RESTITUTION ORDER 
Case No. 051700056 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
Pursuant to statutes governing sentencing (see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 et seq.) and the 
Crime Victims Restitution Act (codified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-101 et seq.), the Court 
considers what amount, if any, defendant must pay in restitution to the victims. Having carefully 
considered and reviewed relevant evidence, memoranda submitted by the parties, and arguments of 
counsel, the Court makes the following order. 
I. 
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
1. Criminal information was filed against defendant on December 19, 2005, charging 
him with one count of securities fraud and one count of theft by deception. The Court 
subsequently granted the State's motion to dismiss the latter charge. See Court's 
Minute Entry, June 21, 2006. 
2. A three-day jury trial commenced on March 5, 2007. At the conclusion of the trial 
on March 7, the jury convicted defendant of securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-1, a second-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-21(2)(b). 
3. Defendant was sentenced on June 6, 2007. 
4. On October 9,2007, Defendant filed a Memorandum in Aid of Restitution Hearing. 
5. The restitution hearings took place in two separate phases—the first on October 10, 
2007, and the second on October 24, 2007. On October 24, the State filed a 
responsive pleading, State's Response to Defendant's Memorandum in Aid of 
Restitution Hearing, and a Restitution Trial Brief. 
6. At the restitution hearings, witnesses were examined, evidence was offered and 
received, and the Court received arguments of counsel. The Court took the matter 




A. The Crime Victims Restitution Act Generally 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a) provides that "[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(a) (2007) (emphasis added). Subsection (b) of that provision mandates that, in considering 
whether restitution is proper, the Court "shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 
77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(b) (2007). 
The Crime Victims Restitution Act (the "Act" or "Restitution Act"), codified in Utah Code 
Annotated Title 77, Chapter 38a, Sections 101 through 601, provides the following relevant 
requirements. First, Section 301 states, "[i]n a criminal action, the court may require a convicted 
defendant to make restitution." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-301 (2007). Section 302 provides 
additional detail and mandates specific action from the Court in a particular circumstance, stating, 
in relevant part, the following: "When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter. . . . [I]n determining 
whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in 
Subsections (2) through (5)." Id. § 302(1). Subsections (2) through (5) require courts to compute 
both "complete restitution" and "court-ordered restitution," id. § 302(2); to state the reasons for 
concluding restitution is appropriate if conclusion is reached, id. § 302(3); to afford a "full hearing" 
to defendants who object to "the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution," id. § 302(4); 
and to consider "all relevant facts" and other factors in computing restitution, id. § 302(5). 
Section 102 of the Act provides definitions of terms "[a]s used in" the Act. Id. § 77-38a-201 
(prefatory language). The following definitions given in Section 102 are thus relevant in construing 
Section 302. 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
* # * 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not 
yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or 
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market 
value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including 
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lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and 
pain and suffering. 
* * * 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages 
to a victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment 
for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may be 
further defined by law. 
# # * 
(14) (a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities, 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
Id. 
With these definitions in mind, the Court returns to the requirement in Section 302(1): 
"When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution 
to victims of crime as provided in this chapter. . . ." Id. § 302(1). The Court now considers this 
provision and relevant definitions from Section 301. 
B. "Criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages " 
The Court is required to order restitution only where "a defendant is convicted of criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages[.]" Id. § 302(1). Where pecuniary damages have 
resulted from a defendant's criminal activity, courts "shall order that the defendant make restitution 
to victims of crime as provided in this chapter[.]" Id. Section 302 thus mandates that courts 
determine (1) whether a defendant has been convicted of criminal activity and, if so, what that 
criminal activity is; (2) determine whether that criminal activity "has resulted in pecuniary damages," 
and (3) identify victims who have suffered pecuniary damages as a result of a defendant's crime and 
order restitution in conformity with the Act. These requirements will be considered in turn. 
1. "Criminal activity" 
"'Criminal activities' means any offense ofwhich the defendant is convicted[.]"/ii. § 102(2). 
At the conclusion of the trial on March 7, the jury convicted defendant of securities fraud under Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-1, made a second-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-21(2)(b). 
2. "Resulted in pecuniary damages " 
The Court is required to order restitution only where "a defendant is convicted of criminal 
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages[.]" Id. § 302(1). Section 102(6) of the Act defines 
"pecuniary damages" as 
all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet incurred, which a person could 
recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
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criminal activities and includes the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost earnings and medical 
expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain and suffering. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(6) (2007). This provision is central to the Court's restitution 
determination process. Under it, the Court must determine that a defendant's criminal activity has 
"resulted in" "demonstrable economic injury... which a person could recover in a civil action[.]" 
Id. §§ 302(1); 102(6). Civil actions generally call for proof by preponderance of the evidence and 
a showing that the defendant's act or omission was the legal cause of the victim's injuries. See 
Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 336 (Utah 2005) (noting that "the typical burden of 
proof applicable to civil actions generally[] [is] a preponderance of the evidence"); Thurston v. 
Workers Comp. Fund of Utah, 83 P.3d 391, 394-95 (Utah 2003) (setting forth elements a plaintiff 
must establish to prevail on a negligence claim). The causation requirement of the restitution statute 
is explicit: a victim's economic injury must "aris[e] out of the facts or events constituting the 
defendant's criminal activities,"/^ § 102(6), and must be the "result[J" thereof. Id. § 302(1). Under 
the statute, the Court must compute economic injury as including "the fair market value of property 
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost earnings" but excluding 
losses associated with pain, suffering, and punitive or exemplary damages. Id. § 102(6). 
In a restitution proceeding following a conviction, then, the State must show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the offense of which the defendant was convicted resulted in 
"demonstrable economic injury . . . which a [victim] could recover in a civil action," including the 
causation requirement of civil actions. "Proximate cause" has been defined in the Utah civil law: 
Proximate cause is that cause which, in the natural and continuous sequence 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without which 
the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one that necessarily 
sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. 
Thurston, 83 P.3d at 395 (alterations, citations, and internal quotations omitted). Thus, causation is 
"conduct which is a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries. . . . If, however, the conduct 
created only a condition or occasion for the harm to occur, it would be regarded as remote, not a 
proximate, cause and would not be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm." Alcaraz v. State, 
44 P.3d 68 (Wyo. 2002). 
3. Victims 
Where pecuniary damages have resulted from a defendant's criminal activity, courts "shall 
order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter. . . . For 
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-3 8a-102(14) and in 
determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as 
provided in Subsections (2) and (5)." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (2007). Subsection 77-38a-
102(14) defines "victim" as including "any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities" but excluding a codefendant or 
accomplice. Id. § 102(14). Section 302(5) provides further indicates what may constitute a "victim" 
under the Act: "A victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a 
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pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct 
in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern." Id. § 302(5)(a). It is notable that Section 302(5) 
seems to reflect the proximate cause requirement in tort actions by insisting that a victim of a 
conspiracy, scheme, or pattern of criminal activity must be a person "directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct[.]" Id. (emphasis added). 
III. 
APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. Is Restitution Appropriate? 
1. "Criminalactivity" 
At the conclusion of the trial on March 7, the jury convicted defendant of securities fraud 
under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1, made a second-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
21(2)(b). See Tr. Trans, at 542. Thus, the offense of which Johnson was convicted was violating 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1, which makes it unlawful for 
any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or 
indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2007). Johnson was convicted of violating this statute. Defendant's 
Memorandum in Aid of Restitution Hearing at 2. 
At trial, testimony and evidence was presented tending to show the following: defendant was 
present at one and up to three meetings where Paul Schwenke presented an investment plan to James 
Young and/or Ronald Myers, the victims in this case. See, e.g., Tr. Trans, at 126-62; 350-52. Over 
the course of the meetings, Paul Schwenke presented to the victims apian under which dairy farmers 
in need of additional capital would transfer the assets of their dairies to a corporation called 
AmericanDairy.com, Inc. In exchange, the farmers would receive shares of stock in the corporation. 
Accordingly, this transaction would ultimately give the farmers access to financing. See Tr. Trans, 
at 124-30; 132-34; 136-62. Testimony at trial indicated that at the meeting(s) at which defendant 
was present, defendant was introduced as an attorney and stock expert, and that defendant explained 
some concepts concerning stock to Young. Tr. Trans, at 127-29; 153-54; 182; 216-17. 
The meetings culminated in the execution of a Stock Purchase/Trade Agreement (the 
"contract") on August 9, 2000, under which Young and Myers transferred the dairy assets to 
AmericanDairy.com. Under the contract, Myers received 150,000 shares of stock and Young 
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received 50,000 shares. Johnson signed the contract as the CEO ofAmericanDairy.com and Young 
signed as a "Managing Member" of Milk-King Dairy, L.C. See State's Restitution Hearing Exhibit 
2; Tr. Trans, at 139-42. Schwenke and Johnson also issued stock certificates to Myers and Young 
on that date. Johnson signed the certificates as president of the corporation. Tr. Trans, at 142-44. 
At trial, both Young and Myers conceded that, prior to attending the meetings described 
above, their dairy was "struggling." Tr. Trans, at 124-25; 214. In November 1999—prior to their 
meetings with Schwenke and Johnson—they had taken out a loan against the dairy from Central 
Bank. Defendant's Restitution Hearing Exhibit 9. See also Tr. Trans, at 214, 239-40. 
At trial, the state presented evidence showing that, during the dates of the meetings preceding 
and concluding with the August 9 transaction, Johnson was in the midst of disciplinary proceedings 
wherein his authority to practice law in Utah was being contested for misappropriating client funds. 
The State argued that Johnson, in failing to disclose the disciplinary investigation and other matters, 
violated Section 61-1-1 (2), which makes it unlawful to "make any untrue statement of a material fact 
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading[.]" The jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
The jury considered the full language of Section 61-1-1, as was provided in the final instructions 
given by the Court. 
We do not know what particular subsection(s) of §61-1-1 Johnson was found to violate; we 
can conclude only that he was found to have violated at least one of them. In the words of his 
attorneys, Johnson was convicted of "securities fraud arising from an August 9, 2000 Stock 
Purchase/Trade Agreement by which Young and Myers transferred title to a dairy farm and 
equipment from Milk King Dairy, L.L.C. to AmericanDairy.com, Inc. and received stock with either 
required omissions of material fact(s) or that a disclosure was made which was false." Defendant's 
Memorandum in Aid of Restitution Hearing at 2. The Court now considers whether Johnson's 
criminal activity of securities fraud caused the victims pecuniary damages recoverable in a civil 
action. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(6) (2007). 
2. Causation: "Resulted in pecuniary damages " to victims 
a. Joint and several liability. The Crime Victims Restitution Act was written with the 
purpose of making victims of crime whole from losses resulting from criminal acts. See State v. 
Corbitt, 82 P.3d 211,215 (Utah 2003) ("the well-settled remedial purpose of our restitution statute 
is 'to compensate victims for the harm caused by a defendant and . . . to spare victims the time, 
expense, and emotional difficulties of separate civil litigation to recover their damages from the 
defendant.'") (quoting Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1027 (Utah 1996)). In restitution 
proceedings, Courts may hold co-offenders jointly and severally liable. See, e.g., State v. Wallace, 
150 P.3d 540, 541 (Utah 2006) (not addressing the issue of joint and several liability in restitution 
specifically, but upholding trial court's sentencing decision and noting that the trial court "imposed 
no fine but made [the defendant] jointly and severally liable with the other scheme participants for 
$ 626,000 in restitution" for damages resulting from a Ponzi scheme). 
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Evidence introduced by the State subsequent to trial indicates that, for some time subsequent 
to the execution of the August 9,2000 agreement, defendant continued to be aware of and, to some 
extent, involved in AmericanDairy.com, Inc., and Schwenke' s activities relating to it. First, the State 
introduced evidence that in May 2001, defendant, acting as counsel for American Dairy, L.L.C., 
drafted an application for a temporary restraining order ("TRO application"). In the TRO application, 
defendant argued that Cory Nance and PDN Investments should be enjoined from "attempting to sell 
by trustee foreclosure sale" the dairy farm owned by American Dairy. Defendant's Application to 
a Temporary Restraining order and Order to Show Cause, State's Restitution Exhibit #1, at 
Facsimile Page 10,12 (^ f 9) (May 22, 2001). In response, Johnson avers that although the pleading 
was in his name and faxed from his office, he did not draft it. 
But defendant did admit to filing a bankruptcy petition on behalfofAmericanDairy.com, 
without consulting Myers or Young, in anticipation of the planned trustee foreclosure sale to enforce 
a $50,000 trust deed taken out by Schwenke against the real property of the dairy. Johnson enabled 
Schwenke to obtain the trust deed, and Johnson's filing of the bankruptcy petition plainly indicates 
his knowledge of the trust deed and, to at least some degree, his continued knowledge of and 
involvement with the AmericanDairy.com scheme. In light of the purpose of the Restitution Act and 
Johnson's apparent continued knowledge of and involvement in the scheme, the Court concludes 
defendant is jointly and several liable with Schwenke for pecuniary damages resulting from the 
scheme. 
The question, then, is what demonstrable economic injuries arose from Schwenke's and 
Johnson's criminal activities such that those who suffered those damages "could recover in a civil 
action[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-l 02(6) (2007). Under the statute, pecuniary damages "include[] 
the fair market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and lossesf.]" Id. 
The State appears to concede to defendant's argument that the losses of victims in this case should 
be computed as the actual value of lost property less any indebtedness against the property. See 
Defendant's Memorandum in Aid of Restitution Hearing, at 6; State's Response to Defendant^ 
Memorandum in Aid of Restitution Hearing, at 4 ("defendant's claim.. . that the value of any loss 
is measured by the fair market value for the property less depreciation and debt owed is a functioning 
textbook definition"); Jamis Johnson Restitution Outline at 1 (computing restitution to Myers and 
Young based on equity in the dairy, with equity in turn computed as appraisal value less a loan on 
the property). 
b. Loss oj the dairy. The State argues that defendant Johnson's acts "led to the demise of 
[Myers' and Young's] farm and the loss of everything therein." State's Response to Defendant's 
Memorandum in A id oj Restitution Hearing, at 2. The Dairy apparently ceased operating in February 
2001. See Appraisal of Milk King Dairy, State's Exhibit #8, at 8. Central Bank foreclosed on the 
dairy some months following the August 9, 2000 transaction. Based on (conflicting) evidence 
submitted in the restitution hearings, the State argues that the equity in the dairy may be valued 
somewhere between $155,000 and $750,000. (The $750,000 figure was derived from the TRO 
Application defendant denies drafting. See Defendant's Application to a Temporary Restraining 
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order and Order to Show Cause, State's Restitution Exhibit #1, at Facsimile Page 12, f 10 (May 22, 
2001).) Defendant appears to argue Myers and Young had no equity in the dairy. Defendant's 
Memorandum in Aid of Restitution Hearing at 5 ("The farmers did not own the market value of the 
farm when they owed more than what it was worth"). 
Defendant argues not only that there was no equity in the dairy, but that his acts did not cause 
the loss of and foreclosure on the dairy in any event. He argues that Myers' and Young's failure to 
continue mortgage payments on the Dairy caused the loss of the Dairy. Defendant's Memorandum 
in Aid of Restitution Hearing at 2. Johnson notes that Myers and Young "allege their inability to pay 
the Central Bank obligation was a secondary result of an entirely independent transaction where 
former co-defendant, A. Paul Schwenke had moved 200-250 head of cattle onto the farm long [after] 
August 9, 2000. Young and Myers apparently incurred loss as a result of expending funds to feed, 
calf and cull those cows which were subsequently repossessed before reaching full milk production 
capacity." Id. However, defendant argues, "[t]his cow transaction occurring months after the August 
9,2000 Stock Purchase Agreement had nothing whatsoever to do with that Agreement and whether 
or not title to the dairy and equipment was titled in Milk King Dairy, L.L.C., or Americandairy.com, 
Inc." Id. In short, defendant argues that the victims' pre-existing financial hardships and Schwenke's 
acts were the "but for" causes of the foreclosure of the Dairy, and not defendant's facilitation of the 
transfer of dairy assets to Americandairy.com. According to defendant, the Stock Agreement is only 
"a remote and hyper-attenuated link" to the foreclosure. Id. at 4. 
The Court finds that while Johnson and Schwenke's actions perhaps accelerated foreclosure 
on the Dairy, the State has not demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that the loss of the 
Dairy can be attributed to Johnson and Schwenke through a civil action. The Court does find, 
however, that through the August 9 contract, Johnson enabled Schwenke to obtain a $50,000 trust 
deed against the real property of the dairy without Myers and Young's permission. Johnson and 
Schwenke were thus the legal cause of Myers' and Young's $50,000 loss stemming from the trust 
deed. 
c. Ronald Myers' losses. The State argues Ronald Myers lost $70,000 as a result of 
Schwenke's and Johnson's acts. Myers obtained a $70,000 certificate of deposit ("CD") as security 
on the loan from Central Bank (which Myers and Young used to purchase new cattle). Prior to 
Schwenke's involvement with the dairy, Myers and Young used the line of credit secured by the CD 
to service the Central Bank loan and make payments on other debts. However, enabled by defendant, 
Schwenke brought an additional 200-250 head of cattle to the dairy, which Myers and Young were 
required to care for and feed. The Court finds that Myers and Young spent approximately $70,000 
to feed and provide for the additional cattle—cattle from which, Myers and Young testify, they 
received de minimis or no monetary benefit.] Once the additional cattle were repossessed, Myers and 
Young were unable to obtain milk from them and therefore had no revenue with which to service 
the loan. As such, Myers and Young defaulted, and Central Bank foreclosed on the CD and the other 
Defendant presented conflicting witness testimony that Myers and Young did receive monetary benefit 
from the additional cattle, but the Court finds Myers and Young's testimony more credible in light of the fact that 
Myers and Young had firsthand knowledge of the additional cattle and associated costs and revenue. 
8 
4te? K 
collateral securing it's debt. The Court finds that Myers would not have incurred this $70,000 loss 
but for Johnson's and Schwenke's acts. Therefore, Johnson and Schwenke are jointly and severally 
liable to Myers for this amount. 
d. Purported losses of others. The State argues that a nearly a score of other organizations 
or people—including equipment providers, feed suppliers, and financial creditors—are victims of 
Johnson's and Schwenke's acts. See Jamis Johnson Restitution Outline at 2-3; State's Response to 
Defendant's Memorandum in Aid of Restitution Hearing at 4. However, the Court declines to find 
these organizations and persons were victims under the Reparation Act because either (1) evidence 
presented by the State was insufficient to show Johnson and Schwenke caused the losses; or (2) the 
losses claimed are too far removed from Johnson's and Schwenke's acts to be losses recoverable in 
a civil action. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(6) (2007). See also id § 302(5)(a) ("A victim of an 
offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes 
any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, 
conspiracy, or pattern") (emphasis added). It is also notable that Myers and Young's creditors 
apparently never filed claims against Myers and Young for their alleged losses (such as seeking 
deficiency judgments against them following the foreclosure sales). 
B. Valuation of "Complete Restitution" and "Court-OrderedRestitution1 
Section 302(2) requires that, "[i]n determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(2) (2007). "Complete 
restitution" is defined as "restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the 
defendant." Id. § 3 02(2)(a). "Court-ordered restitution" is defined as "the restitution the court having 
criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of 
sentencing or within one year after sentencing." Id. § 302(2)(b). Subsection (2) further directs that 
"[cjomplete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in Subsection 
(5)."M§302(2)(c). 
Subsection (5)(b) states that "[i]n determining the monetary sum and other conditions for 
complete restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts[.]" Id. § 302(5)(a). The statute then 
enumerates six specific factors the court must consider in computing complete restitution, only two 
of which are arguably relevant. Those are "the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in 
damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense[,]" id. § 302(5)(b)(i); and "up 
to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to theft of or damage to 
tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's 
current employment at the time of the offense[.]" Id. § 302(5)(b)(v). 
Subsection (5)(c) mandates that, when computing court-ordered restitution, courts must 
consider "the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b)[.]" Id. § 302(5)(c). As noted above, 
Subsection (5)(a) defines a victim of an offense including a conspiracy, scheme, or pattern of 
criminal activity; Subsection (5)(b) directs the court to consider "all relevant facts" and particular 
enumerated factors, the relevant one of which were set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph. 
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Subsection (5)(c) also requires courts to consider the following factors when computing court-
ordered restitution: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution 
will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
Id § 302(5)(c). 
After considering all relevant facts and the factors enumerated for both complete restitution 
and court-ordered restitution, the Court finds that Johnson is jointly and severally liable, with 
Schwenke, for a total amount of $120,000. The amount, $120,000, is the same for both complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. The Court also notes that this order does not preclude 
Myers, Young, or other affected individuals or organizations from bringing civil actions against 
Schwenke and defendant. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that defendant Johnson must pay a 
total of $120,000 to victims Myers and Young. WHEREFORE, defendant Jamis Johnson and 
Paul Schwenke are jointly and severally liable for restitution in the amount of $70,000 to Ronald 
R. Myers and $50,000 to be allocated between James L. Young and Ronald R. Myers as they 
determine. 
Signed this ry day of December, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the day of December, 2007,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESTITUTION ORDER to be delivered to the following parties: 
Mark Baer 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Rodney G. Snow 
Walter A. Romney, Jr. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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MARK L. SHURTLEFF- 4666 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Facsimile (801) 366-0242 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURt 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, : 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
RENEWED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No.: 051700056 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
Defendant Jamis M Johnson's Renewed Motion for New Trial came on for telephonic hearing 
before the Court on February 11,2008. The State of Utah appeared through its counsel Mark W. Baer, 
and Mr. Johnson appeared through his counsel Walter A. Romney, Jr. Based upon the memoranda 
submitted, the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, and good cause shown, 
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that Defendant's Renewed Motion for New Trial is DENIED. 
FWRTH fc&TRlCT C&URT-HU.UM 
201 AUG 12 AH 10- 58 
tuttY J$L 
Approved as to form: 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
Rochey'G. Snow 
Waiter A. Romney, Jr. 
Attorneys for Defendant Jamis M. Johnson 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL to be served via U.S. Mail and 
facsimile on this yA day of August 2008, upon the following: 
Mark W. Baer 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 E. 300 So., 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Charlene Barlow 
Attorney General's Office 
5272 So. College Drive, #200 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Walter A. Romney, Jr. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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STOCK PURCHASE/TRADE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into this z °day of August, 
2000, by and between American-dairy.com, Inc. ("Seller"), and Milk-King Dairy, 
L.C. ("Purchaser). 
WHEREAS, the Seller is the record owner and holder of the issue d and 
outstanding shares of the capital stock of American-dairy.com, Inc. 
("Corporation"), a Utah corporation, which Corporation has issued capital stock of 
10,000,000 shares of .001 cents par value common stock; and 
WHEREAS, the Purchaser desires to purchase said stock and the Seller 
desires to sell said stock, upon the terms and subject to the conditions hereinafter 
set forth; 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and 
agreements contained in this Agreement, and in order to consummate the 
purchase and the sale of the Corporation's Stock aforementioned, it is hereby 
agreed as follows: 
1. PURCHASE AND SALE: 
Subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, at the closing of 
the transaction contemplated hereby, the Seller shall sell, convey, transfer, and 
deliver to the Purchaser certificates representing such stock, and the Purchaser 
shall purchase from the Seller the Corporation's Stock in consideration of the 
purchase price set forth in this Agreement. The certificates representing the 
Corporation's Stock shall be duly endorsed for transfer or accompanied by 
appropriate stock transfer powers duly executed in blank Jn_ejther case with 
signatures guaranteed in the customary fashion. The closing of the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement ("Closing"), shall be held at 220 South 200 East, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on August 3, 2000, at 1:00 p.m., or such 
other place, date and time as the parties hereto may otherwise agree. 
2. AMOUNT AN D PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PKiCE. 
The total consideration and method of payment thereof are fully set out in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
3. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER. 
Seller hereby warrants and represents: 
(a) Organization and Standing. Corporation is a corporation duly 
organized, validly existing and in good standing under the laws of the State of 
Utah and has the corporate power and authority to carry on its business as it is no 
being conducted. 
(b) Restrictions on Stock. 
I. The Seller is not a party to any agreement, written or oral, creating 
rights in respect to the Corporation's Stock in any third person or relating to the 
voting of the Corporation's Stock. 
II. Seller is the lawful owner of the Stock, free and clear of all 
security interests, liens, encumbrances, equities and other charges. 
III. There are no existing warrants, options, stock purchase 
agreements, redemption agreements, restrictions or any nature, calls or rights to 
subscribe of any character relating to the stock, nor are there any securities 
convertible into such stock. 
4. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER AND 
PURCHASER. 
Seller and Purchaser hereby represent and warrant that there has been no 
act or omission by Seller, Purchaser or the Corporation which would give rise to 
any valid claim against any of the parties hereto for a brokerage commission, 
finder's fee, or other like payment in connection with the transactions 
contemplated hereby. 
5. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
(a) Entire Agreement. This Agreement (including the exhibits hereto and 
any written amendments hereof executed by the parties) constitutes the entire 
Agreement and supersedes all prior agreements an.d understandings, oral and 
written, between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof. 
(b) Sections and Other Headings. The section and other headings 
contained in this Agreement are for reference purposes only and shall not affect 
* the meaning or interpretation of this Agreement. 
(c) Governing Law. This agreement, and all transactions contemplated 
hereby, shall be governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with the 
laws of the State of Utah. The parties herein waive trial by jury and agree to 
submit to the personal jurisdiction and venue of a court of subject matter 
jurisdiction located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. In the event that litigation 
results from or arises out of this Agreement or the performance thereof, the 
parties agree to reimburse the prevailing party's reasonable attorney's fees, court 
costs, and all other expenses, whether or not taxable by the court as costs, in 
addition to any other relief to which the prevailing party may be entitled. 
6. OPTION TO PURCHASER. 
Purchaser shall have the option to sell the stock that it purchased under 
this Agreement back to Seller for the following consideration: 
(a) Reconveyance by deed of all the real properties listed on Exhibit A that 
had been conveyed under this Agreement, subject to debt not to exceed the 
balance of the debt that was existing at the time of this Agreement less 
reasonable reduction for principal and interest payments from the time of this 
Agreement. 
(b) Reconveyance by bill of sale of all the personal properties and 
equipment listed on Exhibit A that had been conveyed under this Agreement, 
subject to debt not to exceed the balance of the debt that was existing at the time 
of this Agreement less reasonable reduction for principal and interest payments 
from the time of this Agreement. 
(c) Improvements since this Agreement. 
Purchaser, upon the exercise of the option herein, agrees to reimburse 
Seller for tb?„"=>iue of imncciH^cn^xjt&io the dairy operations from the time of this 
Agreement to the date of the exercise of Purchaser's option. 
I. Cows: Purchaser shall reimburse Seller for ali costs and expenses 
in connection with the purchase of cows purchased by American-dairy.com from 
the time of this Agreement. .If the cows are financed, the parties shall take all 
necessary steps, if permitted by the financing institution to qualify Purchaser to 
assume the indebtedness on the cows. 
II. Equipment including computer and internet: Purchaser shall 
reimburse Seller for the cost of all equipments installed or purchased by Seller 
since the time of this Agreement. 
The parties acknowledge that pursuant to the exercise of this option to 
repurchase, that Purchaser desires, if possible, to acquire and/or continue to 
operate its dairy business with the cows and equipment acquired by Seller. 
However, the Purchaser cannot be compelled to assume any financing or pay 
costs if Purchaser is unable. If the financing on the cows and equipment cannot 
be assured, the Seller and Purchaser agree to work together insofar as possible, 
to let Purchasers operate with the existing financing on them. The aforesaid is 
subject to rights of any financial institution having a lien on or an interest in the 
cows and equipment. 
The Purchaser has the right to exercise this option if, after a reasonable 
time and in no event more than two years from the time of this Agreement, 
American-dairy.com, Inc. has not registered its stock for a public offering. 
7. DIRECTORSHIP. 
Purchaser shall have the right to appoint one member of the Board of 
Directors. Such member will be in addition to the presently constituted board of 
directors. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement has been executed by each of 
the individual parties hereto on the date first above written. 
I-DAIRY.COM, INC. MILK-KING DAIRY, LC. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
AMOUNT AND PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PRICE 
(a) Consideration. 
As total consideration for the purchase and sale of the Corporation's Stock, 
pursuant to this Agreement, the Purchaser shall pay to the Seller the sum of Two 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000), in trade for the equivalent sum 
representing equity in Milk-King Dairy, L.C., properties and equipment. Such total 
consideration to be referred to in this Agreement as the "Purchase Price". 
(b) Payment. 
1. The deed to the following real properties shall be duly 
executed and delivered to American-dairy.com at the time of closing: 
The real property comprising the Milk King Farms, L.C. dairy operation 
as set forth in the attached Deed and legal description 
2. The bill of sale for the following personal properties and 
equipment: 
See the Exhibit attached to that Bill of Sale attached hereto. 
The stock shall be issued as follows: 
Ronald R. Myers 150,000 shares 











John Deer 7200 Tractor 
Schuler4910 Vertical Mixer ^LA y^P^y/ 
Double -12 parallel milk parlor and associated equipment, 
including stalls, milking units, milk transfer equipment, xL. s? ^/f 
milk storage and cooling equipment ^[ rf/*/ 
Heatwatch Electronic Heat Detection System i L . . 
Scoopmobile LD-7 Loader 












Affirmative Disclosure of Material Facts Is Not Required: 
The defendant is not required to have disclosed any fact of any nature under Utah Code 
Anno. §61-1-1(2), the charging statute under the Amended Information being prosecuted herein. 
Instead, you may only consider whether there exists any statement of a material fact which was 
affirmatively actually made which must be true, or that there is no omission which renders 
misleading any such affirmative statement which has been actually made . 
References: 
Utah Code Anno. §61-1-1(2) 
State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss p.8 
State v. Lindsay. 18 P.3d 504 ( Utah App. 2000) 
